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Abstract
I analyze the distributional effects of an environmental policy in the new automo-
bile market: the French feebate. I quantify the monetary and environmental gains and
losses that are due to this new automobile purchase tax/subsidy across consumers. I
develop and estimate a structural model of the demand and supply for new cars that
features a high level of heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences. By exploiting data
on car sales at the municipality level, I identify the heterogeneity parameters through
the correlation that exists between household characteristics and car attributes across
municipalities. I simulate the market equilibrium without the feebate to quantify the
causal welfare and environmental effects of the feebate. The policy reduces average car-
bon emissions but increases the emissions of all the local pollutants, and the effects are
heterogeneous across consumers, car manufacturers and pollutants. The performance
of the feebate is very high for consumer surplus maximization, but there is room to
increase manufacturers’ profits and limit the emissions of local pollutants.
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1 Introduction
Tinbergen’s rule recommends that one policy instrument should be used to achieve only one
objective in the context of macroeconomic policy. Public policies, indeed, have results that
extend beyond the desired outcome. However, sometimes, the same objective can be reached
with different alternative instruments, and the magnitude of the aftereffects can be used as
selection criteria. It is therefore crucial to identify and evaluate the side effects of a potential
regulation. This paper quantifies the direct effects and aftereffects of a specific environmental
regulation on the French automobile market.
Environmental regulations on the automobile market have become very common in de-
veloped countries over the past 10 years, and countries have used various policy tools to
reduce carbon emissions related to automobiles. Regulation instruments include standards
that manufacturers must meet, purchase or annual carbon emission-based taxes, purchase
subsidies and feebates (a combination of purchase taxes and subsidies). The French feebate
has been in place since 2008 and affects the purchases of all new cars. The purchase of low
emission vehicles is encouraged through a rebate (“bonus”) that reaches e1,000, and the
purchase of high emission cars is discouraged through a tax (“malus”) that can be as high
as e2,600 in 2008.
This paper analyzes the effects of the feebate on the French automobile market in 2008.
I evaluate the causal effects of the feebate on consumers, car manufacturers and the carbon
emissions of new cars. I also evaluate the collateral effects of this regulation on inequalities
and local pollution. I analyze the distributional effects of the feebate and identify the winners
and losers across consumers and car manufacturers. Such a rebate/tax scheme implies, by
nature, that some agents are better off while others are worse off and has distributional
consequences. I also quantify the causal effect of the feebate on the emissions of local air
pollutants such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxide (NOX), hydrocarbon (HC) and
particulate matter (PM). These collateral effects are crucial since local pollutant emissions
are unregulated but have a direct impact on air quality. I finally investigate the performance
of the actual feebate scheme in terms of the magnitude of its aftereffects on redistribution
and the emissions of local pollutants and evaluate the potential gains associated with the
optimal schemes.
I use a structural model for the demand and supply of new automobiles to simulate the
market equilibrium without the feebate regulation. The comparison between the observed
market equilibrium and the counterfactual equilibrium identifies the causal effect of the fee-
bate regulation. The structural model is estimated using data on car characteristics and
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prices and aggregate market shares of cars in France between 2003 and 2008. The demand
model incorporates a high level of heterogeneity in terms of preferences for car attributes,
and the identification of the parameters used to measure heterogeneity is ensured by lever-
aging granular data on car sales at the local level. More specifically, I exploit the correlation
that exists between the characteristics of car purchases and consumers’ demographic char-
acteristics across municipalities. On the supply side, I model the pricing strategies of car
manufacturers when they are subject to the feebate regulation and estimate the marginal
costs of all the cars proposed on the market. I use the demand and supply models to simu-
late the purchases and pricing strategies in 2008 without the feebate regulation. I evaluate
the performance of the feebate in terms of its collateral effects by comparing its outcomes to
those of alternative feebate schemes that reach the same average carbon emissions reduction
with an identical budget. I simulate market equilibrium under alternative simple feebate
schemes and select the scheme that is optimal for a given collateral outcome.
I adopt a structural approach that models consumers’ and car manufacturers’ behaviors
to evaluate the causal effects of the feebate since direct policy evaluation methods cannot
separately identify demand and supply reactions to the regulation. Furthermore, most of the
outcomes of interest are not directly observable and measurable such as consumers surplus
and manufacturers profits but can be expressed as functions of parameters of the structural
model. Finally, it is possible to perform counterfactual simulations which are used to evaluate
the performance of the feebate. In contrast, if the causal effect of the feebate was identified
through a reduced-form approach, I would have to make the assumption that the relation
between the outcome of interest and the feebate remains identical under alternative feebate
schemes. This would be a very strong assumption because the transition from one mar-
ket equilibrium to another is driven by the interaction between the responses of consumers
and those of manufacturers, which has no reason to be identical under alternative policy
environments.
I find that the policy increases total welfare by 57 million euros. This global welfare effect
takes into account variations in the consumer surplus, the French manufacturers’ profits, the
monetary cost of the policy and the value of the carbon emissions that have been avoided. The
consumer surplus increases when no tax is introduced to compensate the deficit but decreases
by 36 million euros with a tax. The French manufacturers clearly benefited from the feebate
policy, with an increase of 94 million euros in their profits. The average carbon emissions of
car purchases successfully decreased by 1.56%, but overall carbon emissions increased. Total
carbon emissions increased for two reasons: first, more consumers purchased a new car, and
second, more diesel cars were purchased, which are driven relatively more than gasoline cars.
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Lastly, the average emissions of all the local pollutants increased by a small amount, but
total emissions increased significantly, and the extra emissions represent increases from 2.2%
to 2.8%.
I find that the feebate has heterogeneous effects across consumers and car manufacturers.
Under a flat rate tax, the feebate scheme favors individuals in the middle-income class, while
if the tax is proportional to the income, then the feebate achieves some redistribution from
the richest households to the poorest. The feebate performances are good for maximizing the
consumer surplus, but the inequalities could be further reduced. On the car manufacturers’
side, the feebate obviously stimulated French manufacturers at the expense of most of the
German car manufacturers and some Asian and American car manufacturers. However, there
is room to further improve the French manufacturers’ profits; the current feebate achieves 75%
to 90.3% of the maximum profits depending on the weights assigned to each car manufacturer.
The change in the emissions of local pollutants related to the feebate are also heterogeneous
across individuals and pollutants. The average emissions of nitrogen oxide and particulate
matter increased the most in rich and dense municipalities, while they actually decreased in
the poorest areas. In contrast, the average emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon
increased the most in low-income and rural cities. The current feebate scheme could be
improved to limit the emissions of local pollutants, but the potential gains obtained by
limiting further average emissions are small. There are, nevertheless, large potential gains in
terms of reducing pollution inequalities across cities.
This paper complements two other studies on the effects of the French feebate policy. The
first study by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2013) quantifies the short and long term environmental
impacts of the feebate, while a second study by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2016) disentangles
the sources of carbon emission reduction in the automobile market for the period 2003-2008.
These two papers focus only on aggregate outcomes and do not consider the heterogeneity
of the feebate impacts and its distributional consequences nor do they consider its collateral
effects on the emissions of local pollutants.
Other related papers evaluate the impacts of hypothetical and actual environmental policies
on the automobile market using structural models. Goldberg (1998) was the first to model and
analyze the effects of fuel economy standards in the United States. Huse (2012) examines the
effect of an asymmetric regulation in the Swedish car market: the “Green Car Rebate” that
is awarded under different standards depending on whether the car uses fossil or renewable
energy. Adamou et al. (2014) evaluate the welfare effects of a hypothetical feebate policy in
the German automobile market. Durrmeyer and Samano (2017) compare the efficiency of
hypothetical feebate-type policies with fuel economy standards. Most of these studies focus
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on aggregate effects and do not investigate the distributional consequences of the regulations
or their aftereffects.
The first papers studying the distributional consequences of regulation on the automobile
market consider gas and carbon taxes. Bento et al. (2009) study the distributional conse-
quences of an increase in the gas tax using a model for car purchases and car usage, while
West (2004) investigates alternative regulations to gas taxes such as vehicle subsidies. There
are a few papers that evaluate whether other types of environmental regulations on the au-
tomobile market are progressive or regressive. Jacobsen (2013) estimates the welfare effects
of an increase in fuel economy standards by income class. There are three recent papers that
focus on the distributional effects of regulations. Davis and Knittel (2018) quantifies the
distributional effects of fuel economy standards in the U.S. and finds that they are mildly
progressive. Their study differs from mine since it does not use an equilibrium model for
the car market. Instead, the authors calculate the implicit subsidy or tax implied by the
standard for each car purchased and use to measure consumers’ gains or losses. The sec-
ond recent study is by Holland et al. (2018), and it investigates the distributional effects of
the introduction of electric vehicles and the consequences of the displacement of emissions
from the road to power plants. Finally, Levinson (2018) provides theoretical and empirical
evidence that fuel economy standards are more regressive than fuel taxes using household
transportation survey data. This study, similar to the study by Davis and Knittel (2018),
does not use a demand and supply model and assumes that agents do not reoptimize their
vehicle choice and driving behavior under different tax schemes.
Several other recent papers quantify the distributional effects of environmental regulation
in other contexts: Bento et al. (2015) study the distribution of the gains and costs of the
Clean Air Act Amendments using a hedonic approach on housing prices; Borenstein and
Davis (2016) evaluate the effects of tax credits on clean energy in the U.S.; Reguant (2018)
analyzes the distributional consequences of alternative subsidy schemes for renewable elec-
tricity generation; and Feger et al. (2017) focus on the distribution of the gains and losses
associated with subsidies for solar panels in Switzerland.
This paper evaluates the performance of the current feebate by comparing its outcomes to
those of optimal schemes. This study contributes to the literature on optimal environmental
regulation in line with the recent papers by Holland et al. (2016) and Allcott and Kessler
(2018). The first paper computes the optimal electric vehicle purchase taxes or subsidies
when they can be geographically differentiated, and the second paper derives the optimal
targeting of individuals in the context of an energy conservation information program.
From a methodological point of view, this paper uses a combination of aggregate and
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individual data to estimate demand and supply. Unlike Berry et al. (2004) and Petrin
(2002), I do not observe individual car purchases with direct links between individual choices
and demographic characteristics. Instead, I exploit the correlation that exists between the
average characteristics of cars purchased and the average demographic characteristics at the
local municipality level. The way I exploit the local level data and the estimation method I
use closely follow Nurski and Verboven (2016).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the feebate policy,
describes the data and provides some descriptive evidence. In Section 3, I describe the
structural model of the market equilibrium and the estimation method. Section 4 presents
the estimation results, the analysis of the feebate effects and its performance. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The feebate policy
2.1 Institutional details and data
The environmental feebate policy was announced at the end of November 2007 and was
applied on the 1st of January, 2008. This policy was one of several measures taken by the
government following the Grenelle Environnement roundtables that address environmental
issues. The main objective of this policy was to reduce CO2 emissions related to automobiles.
The policy was announced to be permanent and was supposed to be neutral for the state
budget (its actual cost was 244 million euros in 2008).
The feebate scheme includes rebates and taxes associated with 9 classes of CO2 emissions
(see Table 1 below). The amounts of the rebates and the taxes were supposed to remain con-
stant, whereas the thresholds were to be reduced by 5 grams per kilometer (g/km hereafter)
each year from 2010 on to take into account technical progress. I focus only on the feebate
effects for the year 2008 because car manufacturers were not able to react to the policy by
modifying their car characteristics and car assortment between November 2007 and 2008 but
rather reacted to the policy by changing their car prices, which is possible to credibly model.
The quantification of the welfare effects after 2008 is more challenging since it requires a
model with endogenous product characteristics. In the medium run, environmental regula-
tion is likely to foster innovation (see Klier and Linn, 2012). The issue with such models is
the existence of multiple counterfactual equilibria.
As Table 1 shows, the amounts of the rebates and fees represent a non-negligible per-
centage of the purchase prices and reach 8.1% of the gross price for class A. They are also
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rather heterogeneous across classes, indicating that the feebate scheme affected the market
equilibrium in a non-symmetric way.
Table 1: Feebate scheme in 2008.
Class of Emissions Feebate Percentage of
emissions (in g/km) (in e) 2007 prices
A (60-100] +1,000 8.1%
B (100-120] +700 4.8%
C+ (120-130] +200 1.2%
C- (130-140] 0 0.0%
D (140-160] 0 0.0%
E+ (160-165] -200 -0.98%
E- (165-200] -750 -3.2%
F (200-250] -1,600 -4.3%
G > 250 -2,600 -5.2%
In this analysis, I combine data from three different sources. The first dataset was obtained
from the from the French Syndicate of Car Manufacturers (CCFA) and contains data on new
car characteristics and sales from 2003 to 2008 at the municipality level.1 This database
is constructed from the records of all the registrations of new cars purchased by French
households. I observe the main car characteristics, including the precise level of CO2 emissions
and the catalogue price. I also use information on the car’s horsepower, weight, cylinder, type
of gasoline, and body style. I use data obtained from the French National Survey Institute
to compute the average cost of driving 100 km from cars’ CO2 emissions and the average fuel
prices for each year.2
I construct a detailed dataset that includes the demographic characteristics of all the
households for the 36,569 municipalities in France; these data were obtained from several
publicly available datasets provided by the French National Survey Institute.3 I use data
on the number of households, the median income, the percentage of singles, the number of
couples and couples with children, and the percentage of households in 8 socio-professional
1“Comite´ des Constructeurs Franc¸ais d’Automobiles”.
2The fuel cost ψj of car j is related to the CO2 emissions and the fuel price ρf(j), which depends on the
type of fuel f(j) through the formula: ψj =
CO2j
kf(j)×ρf(j) , where kf(j) is a constant that is equal to 22.87 for
gasoline cars and 26.86 for diesel cars.
3See https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques?categorie=1 .
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categories. In addition, I use median income and the number of households for each year
between 2003 and 2008 as well as data from the 2008 census on household size and socio-
professional activities.4
I use a third dataset obtained from the French Energy Agency (ADEME), which provides
information on the emission levels of local pollutants for all the car models from 2012 to
2015. I observe the emission levels of CO, NOX , HC and PM. Unfortunately, such data do
not exist for car models before 2012, so I use a simple model to predict the values of the
emissions of these local pollutants in 2008 based on the observable car characteristics.
I regress the emissions on the main car characteristics: horsepower, weight, carbon emis-
sions, and body style. I allow these characteristics to have differentiated effects depending on
the fuel type. I also include a fuel specific time trend, year fixed effects and a dummy if the
limit of the emissions of the pollutant were modified between Euro 5 and Euro 6 standards
for that specific engine.5 This is the case for NOX but only for diesel cars and PM for both
types of engines (see the limits set by Euro 4, Euro 5 and Euro 6 in Table 18 of Appendix
A). I also introduce model name fixed effects and exclude car models (i.e., model names)
that are in the ADEME dataset but not in the CCFA dataset.
I estimate the models for CO, NOX, PM, and HC separately. The parameter estimates are
displayed in Table 19 of Appendix A. Overall, the observable car characteristics explain a
significant percentage of the intra-car model variance in terms of the emissions of pollutants.
The effects of car characteristics depend on the fuel type and the pollutant. Horsepower is
positively correlated with the emissions of all pollutants except for PM for gasoline engines.
The correlation between the emissions of local pollutants and CO2 emissions are heteroge-
neous across pollutants and fuel types. While there is a positive association between CO2
emissions and the emissions of CO and PM for gasoline cars and NOX for diesel cars, I obtain
a negative correlation for the other pollutants and engine types. The high correlation that
exists between car attributes probably explains this contrast. The dummy for the Euro 6
norm consistently has a negative effect on the level of emissions. Time trends are also nega-
tive and appear rather differentiated with the type of fuel. For all pollutants, the trends are
steeper for gasoline cars than they are for diesel cars. Finally, the parameters of the diesel
dummies indicate that diesel cars emit on average more NOX than gasoline but less of the
other local pollutants. It may seem surprising that diesel cars emit less PM than gasoline
4The information is provided at the ‘arrondissement” level for the three largest cities (20 for Paris, 16
for Marseille and 9 for Lyon), which is a finer level than that of a municipality.
5Cars from 2012 to 2015 are subject to either Euro 5 or Euro 6, while in 2008, all the cars were under
Euro 4. More details on Euro standards are provided in Appendix A.
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cars; this result is actually consistent with the fact that new diesel cars are all equipped with
a particulate filter and no longer emit more PM than gasoline cars. I account for this with
a strategy to predict emissions under Euro 4 using the parameters of Euro 6.
I use the estimated parameters and make several assumptions to predict the emission levels
of the 4 pollutants during the period 2003-2008. First, I extrapolate the fuel-specific time
trends. Second, for the car models in my CCFA dataset that are not in the ADEME data, I
use the average model fixed effect of the segment. Finally, I use the parameters of the dummy
for Euro 6 to predict average emissions under Euro 4, which I assume the cars purchased
from 2003-2008 are subject to. This calculation is a good approximation of the major part
of the study period since Euro 4 was in place between 2005 and 2009. Furthermore, the
crucial predictions are for 2008; the predictions for 2003-2007 are only used in the descriptive
analysis. I predict the Euro 4 effects only for the pollutants for which the limits changed
between Euro 4 and Euro 5. I use the negative of the coefficient of the dummy for Euro 6
multiplied by a proportionality factor that is equal to the difference in the limits between
Euro 4 and Euro 5 divided by the difference of the limits between Euro 5 and Euro 6 (see
Table 18 in Appendix A for the values of the predicted parameters for Euro 4). Since there
is no change in the regulation of NOX for gasoline cars between Euro 5 and Euro 6, I use the
coefficient for diesel cars. For gasoline cars, there was no regulation on PM before Euro 5, so
I cannot compute a proportionality factor. Instead, I multiply the negative of the parameter
of Euro 6 by 2.6
The average emissions predicted are presented in Table 2. As expected, emissions of NOX
and PM are much higher for diesel engines than gasoline engines. In contrast, emissions of
CO and HC are lower for diesel engines than gasoline engines. This result is consistent with
differences in the emission technology of the different engines and observed emissions over
2012-2015. I also find that the emissions are higher in 2008 than 2012-2015 except for HC
and only in the case of gasoline cars, which are 2 mg/km lower in 2008 than in 2012-2015. It
is, however, not possible to make a direct comparison between 2008 and 2012-2015 for two
reasons. First, emissions are averaged over different sets of cars, and there are cars in the
CCFA sample that are not in the ADEME database. Second, there are several versions of
the same car model in the ADEME database and the number of versions is heterogeneous
across models. In the end, since the objective of the paper is to analyze the consequences
of the feebate, it is crucial to correctly estimate the heterogeneity of emissions across car
models and less important to make realistic predictions of the levels of emissions.
6See more details on the predictions and a discussion of the assumptions in Appendix A.
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Table 2: Average emissions of pollutants by fuel type.
Gasoline cars Diesel cars
2012-2015 2008 (pred.) 2012-2015 2008 (pred.)
CO 275.5 411.3 140.4 224.3
NOX 26.36 33.32 184.4 226.9
HC 42.81 40.78 19.3 22.4
PM 16.53 30.84 11.33 74.6
Note: All emissions are in mg/km except PM, which is in mg/10 km. Un-
weighted average emissions of the car models in ADEME and CCFA datasets.
Using the predicted levels of pollutants, I compute the correlation coefficients between
the emissions of the different local pollutants and carbon emissions. The correlation matrix
is displayed in Table 3. CO2 emissions are positively correlated with those of CO (0.15).
In addition, CO2 emissions are weakly negatively correlated with HC emissions (-0.09) and
negatively correlated with NOX (-0.32) and PM (-0.23). This suggests that because the
feebate is based on CO2 emissions, it is likely to have heterogeneous effects across pollutants.
The different local pollutants are highly correlated with each other. Clearly, there are two
groups of pollutants: on one side, NOX and PM with a correlation coefficient of 0.97 and on
the other side, CO and HC with a correlation coefficient of 0.8. The pollutants of the two
groups are, however, negatively and significantly correlated: the higher the emissions of HC
and CO are, the lower the emissions of NOX and PM.
Table 3: Correlations among the emissions of CO2, CO, NOX, HC and PM.
CO2 CO NOX HC PM
CO2 1 0.15 -0.32 -0.09 -0.23
CO 1 -0.78 0.8 -0.77
NOX 1 -0.69 0.97
HC 1 -0.73
PM 1
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2.2 Descriptive evidence
Heterogeneity of purchases I investigate the heterogeneity of car purchases across French
municipalities. I correlate the average price, rebate and emissions to demographic charac-
teristics through a regression analysis. These regressions are purely descriptive, and the
estimated parameters are not interpreted as causal effects.
I regress the average car price (gross of feebate in 2008), rebate, CO2 emissions and emis-
sions of local pollutants on income, income squared, the percentage of households according to
family size (split into three categories: single, couple, and couple with children), the percent-
age of households according to professional activity (split into 8 categories: entrepreneur,
executive, intermediate profession, employee, manual laborer, retired and other activity),
municipality size (rural, with less than 20,000 inhabitants; urban with between 20,000 and
200,000 inhabitants; and very urban with more than 200,000 inhabitants). The year dum-
mies control for the general evolution of prices and emissions over time. The percentage of
households in each category is multiplied by 10, so the parameters are interpreted as the
effect of a 10% increase in the percentage of households in the category.
The first two columns of Table 4 show that the demographic characteristics are signifi-
cantly correlated with the average price and the average rebate of the cars purchased. Not
surprisingly, I observe that the price is positively correlated with income and income squared.
Couples and families are associated with cheaper cars than singles. The professional cate-
gories associated with the most expensive car purchases are farmers, entrepreneurs and ex-
ecutives. A 10% increase in the percentage of these professional categories are associated
with approximately e500 more spent on a car. Individuals in dense areas tend to buy more
expensive vehicles (they spend on average between e385 and e586 more than individuals
in rural cities). Finally, car prices were slightly cheaper from 2005-2007 than in 2003, while
the average price paid decreased considerably in 2008. This change in prices is the result of
demand and supply effects. On the demand side, it is likely that consumers chose more fuel-
efficient cars, which are also cheaper cars. On the supply side, car manufacturers probably
decreased the gross prices of polluting cars in response to the feebate.
The heterogeneity in the average rebate across municipalities is significantly correlated
with the demographic characteristics as well. The average rebate linearly decreases income,
which may be a sign that rich individuals were less responsive to the feebate. The average
rebate is also higher for families than for singles. An additional 10% of couples and families is
associated with an average rebate that is slightly less than e50 higher. This value is small but
significant relative to the overall average rebate of e87, indicating that these categories may
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have excessively reacted to the feebate in 2008. Employees, entrepreneurs and executives are
associated with significantly lower rebates than retired and manual laborers. Finally, dense
cities are associated with lower rebates: e63 and e95 less in urban and very urban cities,
respectively, than in rural municipalities.
Heterogeneity in emissions The correlation between average emissions of cars purchased
and the demographic characteristics across municipalities reveals that income has a positive
concave relation with CO2 emissions. Couples and families buy cars with lower CO2 emissions
than singles. With 10% more couples or families, the average CO2 emissions of car purchases
is between 2.3 and 2.6 g/km lower. Entrepreneurs, executives and employees buy cars with
significantly higher CO2 emissions. Urban and very urban municipalities are associated with
cars with between 3 and 4.2 g/km of CO2 emissions higher than those purchased in rural
areas. There is a clear negative time trend for CO2 emissions, and they were particularly
reduced in 2006 and 2008 (this is consistent with D’Haultfœuille et al., 2016, who analyze
the different sources of the decrease in CO2 emissions from 2003-2008).
The correlations between the demographic characteristics and average CO and HC are
rather similar, and the patterns of correlations for NOX and PM emissions are alike. This is
not surprising given the important correlations between CO and HC on one hand and NOX
and PM on the other hand. Income is negatively correlated with CO and HC emissions, while
it is positively associated with NOX and PM emissions. The income effects are non-linear
but remain positive for CO and HC and negative for NOX and PM for the entire income
range. Large households are associated with lower CO and HC emissions than singles but
higher emissions of NOX and PM than singles. Municipalities with relatively more farmers,
executives, and manual laborers are associated with lower emissions of CO and HC and
higher emissions of NOX and PM, while it is the exact opposite for municipalities with more
entrepreneurs and employees. Finally, emissions of CO and HC are higher in dense cities
(between 6 and 7.5 mg/km more CO emissions than in rural areas), while NOX and PM
emissions are lower in dense areas (average NOX emissions are between 7.6 and 9.8 mg/km
lower than in rural areas, while average PM emissions were between 1.8 and 2.2 mg/10 km
lower).
CO emissions consistently decreased between 2003 and 2008, with important declines in
2004 (-6.9 mg/km) and 2008 (-8.5 mg/km). There is no clear trend for the evolution of HC
emissions since they decreased between 2003 and 2005, increased in 2006 and 2007 and then
decreased again in 2008. Average emissions of NOX increased over the period, except in 2007.
The increase is particularly important in 2008 (+7.8 mg/km compared to an annual trend of
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3 mg/km between 2004 and 2006). PM emissions also increased significantly between 2007
and 2008 (+1.2 mg/10 km), while they increased at most by 0.6 mg/10 km between 2005
and 2006.
Overall, the correlations between average emissions and the demographic characteristics
are heterogeneous across pollutants. Nevertheless, there are similar patterns of correlation
for CO and HC emissions on one side and NOX and PM emissions on the other side. The
pattern of correlations for CO2 emissions is similar to the ones for CO and HC. Nevertheless,
all the correlations indicate that the year of the feebate introduction is peculiar, revealing
that the feebate probably had an effect on emissions. These are pure correlations, and it is
impossible to make any causal statement at this stage, which explains why I develop and use
a full structural model to measure the causal effect of the feebate on emissions.
In addition to providing evidence on the heterogeneity of purchase patterns, the signifi-
cant correlations support the identification strategy of the heterogeneity parameters, which
leverages the covariance between the demographic characteristics and the car purchase char-
acteristics across municipalities.
Price reaction To get a sense of whether and how car manufacturers have reacted to the
feebate regulation instituted in 2008, I provide a simple regression of the net prices on the
amount of the rebate/fee, and use the car characteristics, car models and year fixed effects
as controls. This regression is not weighted by car market shares to eliminate the demand
effect. The coefficient of the rebate reflects the percentage of the rebate or fee that is passed
through to the final price paid by the consumers. I find that roughly 54% of the rebate or fee
is passed through to the final price, which indicates a probable reaction of car manufacturers.
The regression also indicates that in 2008, the average price of cars did not decrease as much
as in the previous years. This mild reduction in price may be the consequence of strategic
interactions between car manufacturers: the feebate modifies the entire price equilibrium,
and the prices of the cars that are not directly affected change. The structural model below
describes the manufacturers’ optimal pricing strategies and the optimal responses to the
feebate.
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Table 4: Regression of the average characteristics of car purchases on the demographic char-
acteristics of the municipality.
Price Rebate CO2 CO NOX HC PM
Income 1.03
(0.069)
∗∗ −0.064
(0.01)
∗∗ 6.53
(0.249)
∗∗ 14.6
(0.933)
∗∗ −11.6
(0.691)
∗∗ 0.743
(0.1)
∗∗ −2.17
(0.161)
∗∗
Income2 0.029
(0.015)
† −0.002
(0.002)
−0.456
(0.054)
∗∗ −1.4
(0.201)
∗∗ 0.664
(0.149)
∗∗ −0.031
(0.021)
0.067
(0.035)
†
%Couple −0.207
(0.013)
∗∗ 0.047
(0.002)
∗∗ −2.25
(0.046)
∗∗ −5.69
(0.173)
∗∗ 5.32
(0.128)
∗∗ −0.394
(0.018)
∗∗ 1.13
(0.03)
∗∗
%Family −0.538
(0.007)
∗∗ 0.049
(0.001)
∗∗ −2.58
(0.025)
∗∗ −3.25
(0.095)
∗∗ 4.14
(0.07)
∗∗ −0.194
(0.01)
∗∗ 0.864
(0.016)
∗∗
%Farmer 0.469
(0.02)
∗∗ 0.007
(0.003)
∗ −0.028
(0.072)
−10.9
(0.271)
∗∗ 9.18
(0.201)
∗∗ −1.01
(0.029)
∗∗ 2.24
(0.047)
∗∗
%Entrepreneur 0.498
(0.021)
∗∗ −0.026
(0.003)
∗∗ 2.54
(0.075)
∗∗ 1.41
(0.282)
∗∗ −1.78
(0.209)
∗∗ −0.074
(0.03)
∗ −0.341
(0.048)
∗∗
%Executive 0.556
(0.012)
∗∗ −0.028
(0.002)
∗∗ 1.66
(0.042)
∗∗ −2.65
(0.157)
∗∗ 0.416
(0.116)
∗∗ −0.335
(0.017)
∗∗ 0.144
(0.027)
∗∗
%Intermediate 0.1
(0.014)
∗∗ 0.002
(0.002)
0.057
(0.049)
−3.38
(0.184)
∗∗ 2.09
(0.136)
∗∗ −0.357
(0.02)
∗∗ 0.418
(0.032)
∗∗
%Employee 0.231
(0.015)
∗∗ −0.047
(0.002)
∗∗ 2.04
(0.056)
∗∗ 2.32
(0.208)
∗∗ −3.59
(0.154)
∗∗ 0.017
(0.022)
−0.815
(0.036)
∗∗
%Manual laborer 0.355
(0.011)
∗∗ −0.005
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.571
(0.038)
∗∗ −3.29
(0.142)
∗∗ 2.37
(0.105)
∗∗ −0.361
(0.015)
∗∗ 0.602
(0.024)
∗∗
%Other 0.801
(0.015)
∗∗ −0.041
(0.002)
∗∗ 2.01
(0.054)
∗∗ −5.65
(0.202)
∗∗ 2.34
(0.15)
∗∗ −0.735
(0.022)
∗∗ 0.637
(0.035)
∗∗
Urban 0.385
(0.013)
∗∗ −0.063
(0.002)
∗∗ 2.99
(0.047)
∗∗ 6.01
(0.176)
∗∗ −7.62
(0.13)
∗∗ 0.344
(0.019)
∗∗ −1.78
(0.03)
∗∗
Very urban 0.586
(0.014)
∗∗ −0.095
(0.002)
∗∗ 4.19
(0.049)
∗∗ 7.52
(0.183)
∗∗ −9.81
(0.136)
∗∗ 0.454
(0.02)
∗∗ −2.18
(0.032)
∗∗
2004 0.086
(0.014)
∗∗ −1.76
(0.051)
∗∗ −6.92
(0.19)
∗∗ 3.36
(0.141)
∗∗ −0.176
(0.02)
∗∗ 0.305
(0.033)
∗∗
2005 −0.34
(0.014)
∗∗ −4.2
(0.051)
∗∗ −10.5
(0.191)
∗∗ 6.13
(0.142)
∗∗ −0.54
(0.02)
∗∗ 0.268
(0.033)
∗∗
2006 −0.315
(0.014)
∗∗ −7.12
(0.052)
∗∗ −12.1
(0.195)
∗∗ 9.96
(0.145)
∗∗ −0.354
(0.021)
∗∗ 0.875
(0.034)
∗∗
2007 −0.259
(0.015)
∗∗ −7.98
(0.053)
∗∗ −13.2
(0.199)
∗∗ 8.92
(0.148)
∗∗ −0.279
(0.021)
∗∗ 0.46
(0.034)
∗∗
2008 −1.71
(0.015)
∗∗ −17
(0.055)
∗∗ −21.7
(0.206)
∗∗ 16.7
(0.153)
∗∗ −0.521
(0.022)
∗∗ 1.62
(0.035)
∗∗
Intercept 20.2
(0.097)
∗∗ 0.069
(0.015)
∗∗ 154.9
(0.352)
∗∗ 347.1
(1.32)
∗∗ 133.9
(0.975)
∗∗ 34.5
(0.14)
∗∗ 54.7
(0.226)
∗∗
R2 0.345 0.574 0.617 0.171 0.336 0.049 0.286
Note: The average price and the rebate are in e1,000, and income is in e10,000. “%” stands for the
percentage of households in each category. The household sizes and professional activities are in 10%. CO2
emissions are in g/km; CO, NOX and HC emissions are in mg/km; and PM emissions are in mg/10 km.
The reference categories are singles, retired and rural cities. All specifications are estimated using 180,080
observations, except the regression with the rebate as a dependent variable, which uses 30,831 observations
from 2008. The regressions are weighted by the number of households. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%,
∗∗: 1%.
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Table 5: Regression of the net car price on the rebate/fee and controls.
Price Parameter Std. error
Rebate or fee -0.543∗∗ 0.094
Fuel cost -205∗∗ 50.6
Horsepower 1,288∗∗ 31.7
Cylinder capacity 1,598∗∗ 174
Weight 1,331∗∗ 62.2
Coupe/convertible 2,542∗∗ 186
Station wagon 232∗ 102
Diesel 1,148∗∗ 237
2004 -344∗∗ 118
2005 -454∗∗ 127
2006 -570∗∗ 131
2007 -719∗∗ 131
2008 -781∗∗ 150
No. of observations 5,266
R2 0.978
Note: The regression includes car model fixed effects.
The price and rebate are in e, the horsepower is the
fiscal horsepower, the fuel cost is in e/100 km, the
cylinder capacity is in 1,000 cm3, and the weight is in
100 kg. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
3 Model
In this section, I present a model of demand and supply for new automobiles both with and
without the feebate regulation. The model allows for heterogeneous preferences related to
the demographic characteristics. The demand is represented by a random coefficients logit
model that is similar to the model used in Nurski and Verboven (2016). The supply model
formalizes the pricing strategies of the car manufacturers, which are multi-product firms that
compete with each other as in the standard model of Berry et al. (1995) .
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3.1 Demand
I consider Nm potential buyers from municipality m choosing either to purchase one of the
J cars offered or not to purchase a car (which is the outside option and is denoted by 0).
Consumers do not have preferences for the cars themselves but for the attributes of the cars.
Each consumer, denoted by i, maximizes her utility, which is a linear function of the car
characteristics and the price. The index j stands for the car. I omit the year index to keep
the number of indexes small.
Uimj = Xjβm − αmpj + ξj + imj.
Xj and ξj represent observed and unobserved car characteristics, respectively, and pj is the
price. imj is an individual and car-specific preference term, which is assumed to be identically
and independently distributed according to an extreme value. βm and αm are the parameters
for preferences for car attributes and price sensitivity, respectively. These parameters are
common to all individuals within a municipality. I further assume that these parameters are
deterministic functions of the demographic characteristics:
βm = β¯ + Σ
XDm
αm = α¯ + Σ
pDm,
where Dm are the demographic characteristics of the consumers in municipality m. The mean
utility of the outside option is normalized to 0 so that:
Uim0 = im0.
The utility function can be expressed as the sum of the mean utility (δj), a deviation from
this mean related to the demographic characteristics of municipality (µmj) and an individual
error term:
Uimj = δj + µmj + imj.
Because of the distribution of imj, the probability that consumer i from municipality m
chooses car j, which is also equal to the market share of car j in the municipality, is expressed
as:
simj = smj =
exp (δj + µmj)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp (δk + µmk)
.
Then, the market share of car j at the national level is:
sj =
∑
m
φm
exp (δj + µmj)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp (δk + µmk)
,
where φm is the percentage of consumers in each municipality: φm =
Nm∑
mNm
.
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3.2 Supply
I assume that the car market is an oligopolistic market with F firms selling differentiated
cars. Car manufacturers have market power and set their prices taking into account the
demand and the prices of the competitors.7 I assume that the car manufacturers set their
prices nationally, so there is no price discrimination across municipalities. This assumption is
consistent with the use of catalogue prices as optimal prices since I do not observe transaction
prices.8 The profit of manufacturer f selling the set of cars F is:
pif =
∑
j∈F
∑
m
Nmsmj(p)× (pj − cj) ,
where cj is the marginal cost. smj(p) is the market share of product j that depends on the
prices of all the cars, which are represented by the vector p. The optimal price pj is derived
from profit maximization such that:
∑
m
φm
(
smj(p) +
∑
k∈F
(pk − ck)∂smk
∂pj
(p)
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ F .
The expression above can be written with vectors and matrices:
s(p) + Ω(p)(p− c) = 0,
where s(p) is the vector of aggregate market shares, and Ω(p) is the matrix of semi price
elasticities, which is defined as:
Ω(k,j)(p) =
{ ∑
m φm
∂smj
∂pk
(p), if k and j ∈ F
0, otherwise.
The optimal prices are:
p = c− (Ω(p))−1 s(p).
3.3 Market equilibrium under the feebate regulation
The feebate regulation modifies the optimal choices of the consumers and the firms’ pricing
strategies. Let λj be the rebate or fee associated with the level of CO2 emissions of car
7I abstract here from modeling the vertical relations between car manufacturers and dealers and assume
perfect integration such that the manufacturers set the final prices paid by the consumers.
8I could apply the methodology developed by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018) to allow for unobserved price
discrimination across municipalities, but the computation cost would be very high given the large number of
municipalities.
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model j. I adopt the convention that λj is positive for a fee and negative for a rebate. For
this analysis, p˜ denotes the vector of the prices set by car manufacturers under the feebate
regulation. Consumer i’s utility is modified as follows:
Uimj = Xjβm − αm(p˜j + λj) + ξj + imj.
The market shares under the feebate policy are:
s˜j =
∑
m
φm
exp
(
δ˜j + µ˜mj
)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp
(
δ˜k + µ˜mk
) ,
where δ˜j = Xjβ¯ − α¯(p˜j + λj) + ξj and µ˜mj = XjΣXDm + (p˜j + λj)ΣpDm. Car manufacturers
set their prices taking into account the potential rebates and taxes consumers are subject to.
The profit function of firm f is now:
pif =
∑
m
Nm
∑
j∈F
smj(p˜+ λ)× (p˜j − cj) ,
The optimal prices satisfy:
∑
m
φm
(
s˜mj(p˜+ λ) +
∑
k∈F
(p˜k − ck)∂s˜mk
∂pj
(p˜+ λ)
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ F .
Let p˜nj = p˜j +λj denote the price net of rebate or fee. I can rewrite the previous equation as:
∑
m
φm
(
s˜mj(p˜
n) +
∑
k∈F
(p˜nk − λk − ck)
∂s˜mk
∂pnj
(p˜n)
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ F .
The feebate effect on the pricing strategies is identical to a marginal cost increase (for a fee)
or reduction (for a rebate). Because of market power and strategic interactions, not all the
fee or rebate is passed through to the consumer, but car manufacturers adapt their margins.
Car manufacturers are able to extract a part of the rebate by increasing the prices of cars
with rebates. In case of a fee, the car manufacturers lower their price and decrease their
margins to avoid large reductions in sales.
3.4 Estimation
I estimate the parameters of utility and the firms’ marginal costs using the generalized method
of moments (GMM). I use the standard aggregate demand and supply moments, as in Berry
et al. (1995), complemented with micro moments in the spirit of Berry et al. (2004) and
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Petrin (2002). The micro moments leverage the information on car sales at the municipality
level and ensure the identification of the heterogeneity parameters. Specifically, I use the
covariance between the characteristics of car purchases and the demographic characteristics
across municipalities, as Nurski and Verboven (2016).
I do not directly use sales at the municipality level for two related reasons. First, there
are many null market shares, which the logit model cannot rationalize given the assumption
that the error term is extreme value distributed. Second, the sales at the local level fail to
generate precise estimates of the market shares because there are only a few sales in each
municipality: the maximum number of car sales is 433, and the average number of sales is
19. The estimates of the local market shares are too sensitive to the presence of outliers and
are not reliable for estimating the demand model.
Aggregate moments The aggregate moment conditions are based on the interaction of
unobserved product characteristics ξj with the instruments Zj. The vector ξ is unobserved,
but it is such that the theoretical market shares are equal to the observed ones:
sobsj = sj(ξ, θ)
θ represents the vector of the parameters (β¯, α¯,ΣX ,Σp). To invert the market share equation
and recover the vector of the unobserved product characteristics ξ, I use the contraction
mapping suggested by Berry et al. (1995).
The price pj is endogenous because it is likely to be correlated with the unobserved product
characteristics ξj. The firms have market power, and their pricing decisions depend on the
demand, including its unobserved component. The instruments I use are functions of other
products’ characteristics, such as those used in Berry et al. (1995). The moment conditions
are E(ξjzj) = 0, and the sample analogues are given by:
Gd(θ) =
1
J
∑
j
ξj(θ)zj.
In addition to the moment conditions from the demand side, I construct moment conditions
using the supply side, starting from the specification of the marginal cost equation:
ln cj = X
s
j γ + ωj
ln (pj −mj(θ)) = Xsj γ + ωj,
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where mj(θ) is the margin of car j obtained from the price optimality condition, X
s
j are the
observable cost shifters and ωj are the unobservable cost shocks. The moment conditions are
based on the independence between the cost shocks and the instruments Zs: E(ωjzsj ) = 0. I
use the sample analogue:
Gs(θ, γ) =
1
J
∑
j
ωj(θ, γ)z
s
j .
Micro moments The micro moments exploit the information on the demographic char-
acteristics and the market shares of products at the municipality level. More specifically,
the micro moments match (i) the predicted average demographic characteristics of the car
purchasers and (ii) the covariances between the demographic characteristics and the prod-
ucts’ characteristics and their empirical counterparts. The sets of micro moments are crucial
for identifying the observed heterogeneity, as noted in Berry et al. (2004), Petrin (2002) and
Nurski and Verboven (2016). For this analysis sj, smj, D¯, and x¯ denote the observed ag-
gregate market share, the municipality market share, the mean demographic characteristics
and the mean product characteristics, respectively, while sj(θ), smj(θ), D¯(θ), and x¯(θ) are
the predicted values for a given parameter θ. The third set of moments is: (i)
Gm,(i)(θ) =
1
J
∑
j
∑
m φmsmjDm
sj
−
∑
m φmsmj(θ)Dm
sj(θ)
,
and (ii)
Gm,(ii)(θ) =
1
J
∑
j
∑
m φmsmj(xj − x¯)(Dm − D¯)
sj
−
∑
m φmsmj(θ) (xj − x¯(θ))
(
Dm − D¯(θ)
)
sj(θ)
,
where xj is one product characteristic, and x¯ is its average. D¯ is the average demographic
characteristic. Since I exactly match the aggregate market shares, I have sj(θ) = sj and
x¯(θ) = x¯, and the moments can be written as:
Gm,(i)(θ) =
1
J
∑
j
∑
m φmDm (smj − smj(θ))
sj
,
and
Gm,(ii)(θ) =
1
J
∑
j
∑
m φm
[
smj(Dm − D¯)− smj(θ)
(
Dm − D¯(θ)
)]
(xj − x¯)
sj
.
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4 Results
4.1 Estimation results
I estimate a simple logit model without individual heterogeneity in preferences using moments
only from the demand and supply. I also estimate the model with heterogeneity relying on the
three sets of moments derived in the previous section. The observed product characteristics
introduced in the utility function are the price (net of feebate in 2008), the cost of driving,
the horsepower, the cylinder capacity, the weight (as proxy for car size), and the type of car
body (coupe, wagon or sedan). I also include year fixed effects to capture symmetric shocks
on the automobile market and brand fixed effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity
of cars at the brand level. I allow for individual heterogeneity in terms of price sensitivity,
fuel cost, weight and cylinder capacity. I assume that price sensitivity is a linear function of
the income, while I allow fuel cost sensitivity to depend on the income and the size of the
municipality. Municipalities are split into two categories: less than 20,000 inhabitants (rural)
and more than 20,000 inhabitants (urban). I consider that the valuation for weight can be
different according to municipality density. Finally, I allow the valuation of cylinder capacity
to depend on household size. Household size is represented by the percentage of households
in each of these two categories: singles and families (with or without children). Finally, I use
a log-linear specification for the marginal cost function and consider the following variables as
cost shifters: horsepower, fuel consumption (in liters for 100 kilometers), weight and cylinder
capacity. I also introduce brand fixed effects in the cost function.
The estimation method used in this paper relies on instruments. I make the standard
assumption that the products’ characteristics, other than price, are exogenous, and I use these
product characteristics as instruments. I construct additional sets of instruments that are
functions of the characteristics of other products. The characteristics of competing products
are correlated with the price through the strategic interactions across firms: if a car has close
substitutes, it has lower market power and therefore a lower price. I also use functions of the
characteristics of the other cars of the same brand. The argument is similar: if the brand
offers many close substitutes to a car, then the manufacturer has high market power and
is able to set a high price. More precisely, I use three sets of instruments: the sums of the
characteristics of all the other brands’ cars, the sums of the characteristics of other cars of
the same brand and the sums of the characteristics of the other brands’ cars in the same
segment. I consider 8 segments: mini, small family, large family, executive, small minivans,
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large minivans, sports cars and allroad.9 I use the same instruments to construct the demand
and supply moments but do not use instruments for the micro moments.
I estimate the model using a sample of municipalities to reduce the computation cost
associated with the calculation of aggregate market shares. The market share inversion uses
the contraction mapping proposed by Berry et al. (1995), which involves the computation of
the aggregate market shares many times, which explains why I rely on a sample. I randomly
draw 3,000 municipalities (approximately 10% of all municipalities) with a weight that is
proportional to the number of households. For the data to be consistent with the model, I use
aggregate market shares, which are computed by summing the sales over the municipalities
sampled. For more details on the representativeness of the sample, see Appendix B. Note
that I rely on a sample of municipalities only for the estimation, and I use the full set of
municipalities for the welfare analysis.
Prior studies note that it is necessary to aggregate different versions of products to ob-
tain exploitable variations in market shares across products and to obtain a choice set of a
reasonable size. I define a product (car model) as a brand, model name, body style (sedan,
wagon or coupe), and class of CO2 emissions. I do not use the fuel type to directly define
car models, but it is highly correlated with the class of CO2 emissions, so cars with different
fuel types are generally in two different classes of CO2 emissions and are therefore considered
to be two different car models. To each car model, I assign the characteristics of the most
frequently purchased version of the car model (if there are an equal number of sales, then I
select the characteristics of the cheapest version). I finally obtain 5,266 different car models
over the six years under study. To compute the market shares of the products and an outside
option, I assume the potential market is one-fourth of the total number of households. For
the estimation, I use one-fourth of the total number of households from the sample of selected
municipalities.
I check to ensure that the micro moments are useful for identifying the heterogeneity pa-
rameters by computing the influence matrix, as suggested by Andrews et al., 2017 (see Table
21 in Appendix C). As expected, the moments that involve the covariance between the
car characteristics and the consumers’ characteristics have a large influence on the parame-
ters of interactions between the cars and the consumers’ characteristics (see more details in
Appendix C).
9Formally, I consider: ∑
k∈B′,B′ 6=B
xk,
∑
k∈B,k 6=j
xk,
∑
k∈B,B′ 6=B,k∈g
xk,
where index g stands for the segment, and B and B′ are the set of cars of brands b and b′, respectively.
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Table 6 displays the estimated parameters for the models both with and without het-
erogeneity in consumers’ preferences. The price and the fuel cost have significant negative
coefficients. The estimates of the model with heterogeneity are in line with those of the
simple model. Since the parameters of heterogeneity are significant, I use the model with
heterogeneity as the main specification. Weight and horsepower are characteristics that con-
sumers appreciate, while they dislike cylinder capacity. On average, individuals prefer sedans
or coupes to cars with a wagon body. I find, surprisingly, that price sensitivity increases with
income. The distribution of price sensitivity is displayed in Figure 1. This figure shows that
the price sensitivities are moderately heterogeneous and the price parameters are between
-2.2 and -1.1. On the other hand, the sensitivity to fuel cost decreases with income, as ex-
pected. The sensitivity to fuel cost is also lower in urban municipalities than in rural areas.
I find that consumers living in urban municipalities value the car weight less, reflecting het-
erogeneity in car usage across municipality densities. I also observe that couples and families
value cylinder capacity more than singles. The estimated cost parameters have the expected
signs, except for fuel consumption, which tends to increase the cost. However, this parameter
is only significant at the 5% level. According to the estimates, it is more costly to produce
cars that are heavy, have more horsepower and more cylinder capacity.
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Table 6: Estimation results.
Model without heterogeneity Model with heterogeneity
Parameter Std. err. Parameter Std. err.
Utility parameters
Price -1.56∗∗ 0.01 -0.423∗∗ 0.071
Horsepower 0.296∗∗ 0.021 0.294∗∗ 0.021
Fuel cost -0.383∗∗ 0.016 -0.928∗∗ 0.023
Weight 0.326∗∗ 0.017 0.366∗∗ 0.018
Cylinder capacity -0.088 0.125 -0.366∗∗ 0.127
Convertible -0.089 0.093 -0.072 0.092
Wagon -0.897∗∗ 0.066 -0.874∗∗ 0.066
Intercept -9.27∗∗ 0.244 -9.04∗∗ 0.244
Income × fuel cost 0.283∗∗ 0.01
Income × price -0.624∗∗ 0.037
Urban × fuel cost 0.059∗∗ 0.006
Urban × weight -0.059∗∗ 0.004
%Couple × Cylinder cap. 0.325∗∗ 0.049
Cost parameters
Intercept -1.78∗∗ 0.051 -1.71∗∗ 0.063
Horsepower 0.056∗∗ 0.003 0.063∗∗ 0.003
Fuel consumption 0.036∗ 0.015 0.034∗ 0.014
Weight 0.123∗∗ 0.004 0.12∗∗ 0.005
Cylinder capacity 0.086∗∗ 0.02 0.048∗ 0.019
Note: Price and income are in e10,000 and deflated, horsepower is the fiscal horsepower, fuel cost is
measured as e/100 km, weight is in 100 kg, cylinder capacity is in 1,000s of cm3 and fuel consumption is
in L/100 km. “Urban” is a dummy that equals one for municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants,
and “%Couple” is the frequency of couples with or without children in the municipality. Both models
are estimated using 5,266 car models × years and include brand dummies in the utility and the cost
function. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
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Figure 1: Distribution of price sensitivities.
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Note: The kernel estimator of the density of price sensitivities uses a Gaussian
kernel for 31,584 municipalities in 2008 weighted by the number of households.
The top and bottom 1% are trimmed.
4.2 Aggregate effects of the feebate
The effects of the feebate policy on the car market are measured by comparing the observed
equilibrium in 2008 when the feebate is in place with the counterfactual market equilibrium
without the feebate. Using the structural model of demand and supply and the estimated
parameters of preferences and marginal costs, I first solve for equilibrium prices and market
shares for the sample of 3,000 municipalities. I then compute the market share for all munic-
ipalities using the prices recovered in the first step. I prefer to solve for optimal prices using
the sample of municipalities rather than using all municipalities because the observed prices
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in 2008 are optimal given this representative sample.10
Overall, prices would not be very different without the feebate, indicating that the fees
and rebates were mostly passed through to consumers. I find that the prices gross of the
feebate would have been up to 0.7% higher for cars with a fee and up to 0.4% lower for cars
with a rebate.
Gains for consumers are measured through variations in surplus, which is the expected
utility of their best choice. Since the only source of heterogeneity within each municipality
is included in the individual level and product specific shock ik, individual surpluses are
identical in the same municipality. The average consumer surplus in municipality m is:
CSm =
ln
(
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp (δk + µmk)
)
αm
,
and the variation in surplus due to the feebate is:
∆CSm =
ln
(
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp (δk + µmk)
)
− ln
(
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp
(
δ˜k + µ˜mk
))
αm
,
where δ˜k and µ˜mk represent the mean utility and the municipality-specific portion of the
utility without the feebate policy, respectively, while δk and µmk are those with the feebate
policy, respectively. I also compute consumers’ surplus when a tax Tm is introduced to finance
the cost of the feebate. I consider a lump-sum tax as the first mechanism to subsidize the
deficit Tm = T¯ = e32.3. I also examine a flat tax that is proportional to the income tax
to offset the deficit: Tm = τ
Im
10,000
= e20.1× Im
10,000
, where Im is the median income in the
municipality. The proportional tax leads to individual taxes between e13 and e89 with
a median of e31, which is slightly below the lump-sum tax. With a tax, the variation in
consumer surplus is:
∆CSm =
ln(exp(−αmTm)+
∑J
k=1 exp(δk+µmk−αmTm))−ln(1+
∑J
k=1 exp(δ˜k+µ˜mk))
αm
= Tm +
ln(1+
∑J
k=1 exp(δk+µmk))−ln(1+
∑J
k=1 exp(δ˜k+µ˜mk))
αm
.
Ultimately, the type of tax used to subsidize the deficit generated by the feebate policy does
not affect the total consumer surplus or the total welfare effect. This result occurs because
I specify a linear utility function that rules out an income effect. However, the type of tax
used has consequences on the distribution of gains and losses across municipalities.
10I also solved for optimal prices using the whole set of municipalities and find a small average absolute
price difference of e72 and an average relative price difference of only 0.34%.
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Table 7 presents the aggregate effects of the feebate policy on average CO2 emissions, overall
sales as well as the welfare effects on consumers and car manufacturers. I also compute the
annual carbon emissions avoided by assuming gasoline cars are driven 10,000 kilometers,
while diesel cars are driven 17,000 kilometers.11 To take into account CO2 emissions total
welfare, I use the value of e40 for each ton of CO2 avoided.
The main objective of the feebate, the reduction of CO2 emissions, was achieved since the
feebate is responsible for a decrease of 2.2 g/km in the average CO2 emissions of new cars.
This reduction corresponds to a reduction of 1.56% in average emissions. This figure might
appear small, but it is 40% higher than the trend for average CO2 emissions observed over
the period 2003-2007 (-1.57 g/km per year).12
The feebate contributed to an increase in overall sales of new cars by 2%, which amounts to
approximately 24,000 more cars sold than without the feebate. In this analysis, unfortunately,
I cannot distinguish whether these new sales are due to a substitution from a purchase on
the second hand market, the anticipation of the replacement of an old car or the entry of
new car purchasers. In the welfare analysis, these sales are assumed to be due to the entry of
new consumers because I do not have information about previous cars owned and purchases
on the second hand market. In addition, I have to ignore the effect of the feebate on the
second hand car market and the pace of car replacement (see Jacobsen and Van Benthem,
2015 for a study of the effects of emissions leakage in the used car market). Thus, here, I
provide a conservative estimate of CO2 emissions avoided that does not take into account
substitution from potentially high-emitting old cars that are kept or acquired through the
second hand market, which explains why we obtain 20,000 extra tons of CO2 emissions each
year. An increase in the share of diesel vehicles also contributes to an increase in annual CO2
emissions since diesel cars are assumed to be driven 7,000 km more each year than gasoline
cars. Indeed, the feebate is responsible for an increase of 0.44 points in the share of diesel
cars.
Using the estimates for marginal costs, I am able to compute the manufacturers’ margins
for each car and the additional profits or losses generated by the feebate. The feebate
increased the overall industry profits by 2.1%, but French manufacturers’ profits increased
by almost twice as much (3.9%). The total consumer surplus also increased because of the
feebate, with a monetary gain of 187 million euros (which corresponds to an increase in total
consumer surplus of 2.2%). However, the increase in consumer surplus is lower than the cost
11These figures represent the average kilometers driven in France in 2007 for diesel and gasoline cars (see
D’Haultfœuille et al., 2013).
12This trend is estimated by regressing CO2 emissions on a trend using car sales over the period 2003-2007.
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of the feebate, and reached 223 million euros. Therefore, there is a negative variation in
total consumer surplus when the deficit is offset by a tax on individuals (-35.5 million euros).
Because the gains for French manufacturers (94 million euros) are greater than the sum of
consumer surplus losses and the additional CO2 emissions, the overall effect of the feebate is
positive and reached 57 million euros.
Table 7: Aggregate welfare effect of the feebate policy.
3,000 municipalities All municipalities
Feebate No Variation Feebate No Variation
Feebate (in %) Feebate (in %)
Average CO2 138.1 140.2 -1.56 138.3 140.5 -1.56
Share of purchases 17.02 16.68 2.07 18.23 17.87 1.99
Total sales 121 118 2.54 1,249 1,225 1.96
Share of diesel 68.48 67.99 0.72 70.81 70.37 0.62
Profits French 240.3 231.2 3.98 2,488 2,395 3.91
Profits all 748.9 732.6 2.22 7,756 7,594 2.13
Consumer surplus 825.1 806.7 2.28 8,654 8,467 2.21
Annual CO2 0.25 0.24 0.71 2.58 2.56 0.6
∆ CS 18.43 187
∆ Profits French 9.19 93.58
∆ Monetary cost 21.86 222.6
∆ Cost CO2 0.07 0.62
∆Welfare 5.69 57.42
Note: “CS” stands for consumer surplus. Average CO2 is in g/km. The shares of purchases and
diesel are in %. Total sales are in thousands. Profits, consumer surplus, monetary cost and cost of
CO2 emissions and welfare are in million euros. Annual CO2 emissions are in millions of tons. The
cost of CO2 emissions avoided is computed using the value of e40 per ton of carbon.
I now investigate the effects of the feebate on the average emissions of local pollutants.
Table 8 displays average emissions of local pollutants both with and without the feebate. The
average emissions of all pollutants have increased because of the feebate, but the changes
are rather small. The feebate had virtually no impact on the average emissions of CO, while
it marginally increased NOX, HC and PM emissions. Of all the emissions, HC emissions
increased the most because of the feebate. Overall, the feebate increased the average emissions
of all local pollutants, indicating a trade-off between carbon emissions and local pollution.
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However, even if the effects on average emissions are modest (less than half a percent), once
converted to annual emissions, they imply a significant impact on the total emissions of local
pollutants as annual emissions increase between 2.2% and 2.8%.
Table 8: Emissions of local pollutants both with and without the feebate.
3,000 municipalities All municipalities
Feebate No Variation Feebate No Variation
Feebate (in %) Feebate (in %)
Average emissions
CO 307.8 307.8 -0.0015 303 302.9 0.031
NOX 163.1 162.6 0.346 167.4 166.9 0.269
HC 32.4 32.3 0.361 31.9 31.8 0.423
PM 59.1 59 0.190 60.2 60.1 0.152
Annual emissions
CO 514.1 502.3 2.31 5,299 5,181 2.23
NOX 324.8 317 2.42 3,453 3,375 2.25
HC 54.6 53.1 2.81 563.1 547.5 2.76
PM 11.4 11.1 2.37 120.7 118 2.24
Note: All average emissions are in mg/km, except PM is in mg/10 km. Annual
emissions are in tons.
4.3 Identifying winners and losers
I first analyze the heterogeneity of the monetary effects of the feebate across consumers.
I first investigate the link between consumer surplus variations and the median income of
the municipality. Table 9 displays the average surplus variations by income decile both in
level and in percentage of the average surplus without the feebate. Assuming that there
is no deficit compensation with a consumer tax, all individuals gain from the feebate, but
the monetary gains are heterogeneous. The benefits increase monotonically with the income
decile and increase from e19.1 for the first decile to e35.5 for the highest income decile.
However, in relative terms, these gains increase until the ninth decile and then decrease for
the highest decile. Still, in relative terms, individuals below the fourth income decile gain
less than average, while individuals in the higher deciles gain more than average.
When the deficit is subsidized by a lump-sum tax, the analysis is pretty similar since the
variation in the average individual surplus is simply shifted by the amount of the tax (e32.3).
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Under this scenario, all the income categories experience welfare losses except the two highest
income deciles. The maximal average loss is e13 for the lowest income decile. On average,
consumers lose e5.2 which represents only 0.5% of their average surplus.
When the deficit is offset by a tax that is proportional to the income, the pattern is
different since higher incomes are associated not only with larger gains but also higher taxes.
In absolute terms, the effects on the surplus are rather homogeneous between the first and the
eighth deciles (between e-4.45 and e-3.78), while the ninth and tenth income deciles decrease
by e5.4 and e13.4, respectively. On average. the highest income class pays a tax of e50,
which is more than two times the average tax for the first income decile (e23). In relative
terms, the heterogeneity is less pronounced since the average loss for the highest income
decile actually represents only a small percentage of the average surplus of the individuals in
this decile.
Table 9: Average consumer surplus variation by income decile.
Income decile No tax Lump-sum tax Proportional tax
level % level % level %
≤ d1 14,629 19.1 1.8 -13.3 -1.31 -4.01 -0.41
d1-d2 15,666 22.8 2.04 -9.64 -0.92 -3.78 -0.39
d2-d3 16,356 24.2 2.13 -8.33 -0.79 -3.82 -0.38
d3-d4 17,059 25.3 2.21 -7.2 -0.69 -3.97 -0.4
d4-d5 17,661 25.9 2.29 -6.57 -0.64 -4.41 -0.44
d5-d6 18,412 27.1 2.35 -5.38 -0.52 -4.45 -0.44
d6-d7 19,475 28.9 2.38 -3.62 -0.36 -4.16 -0.4
d7-d8 20,954 30.8 2.45 -1.63 -0.18 -4.41 -0.4
d8-d9 23,589 33.2 2.54 0.74 0.02 -5.4 -0.46
d9-d10 50,696 35.5 2.28 3.03 0.24 -13.4 -0.72
Average 27.3 2.25 -5.19 -0.51 -5.19 -0.44
Note: The second column provides the value of the highest decile. “Level”
represents variations in the level (euros), while “%” represents variations in
relative terms, using the value of the consumer surplus without a feebate as
a reference.
Figure 2 graphically shows the gains and losses as a function of income using local poly-
nomial regressions. Under the lump-sum tax scenario, the curve is bell-shaped, while under
a proportional tax, the consumer surplus variation is flat until e25,000 and then decreases
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rapidly. The losses are particularly high at the very top of the income distribution under
both tax systems. I find that the highest income is associated with a reduction in the average
surplus by -2.3%, which is much larger than the average loss of -0.72% for the highest in-
come decile. The few very rich individuals lose the most due to the feebate regulation under
the two tax schemes. I find a similar pattern for the distribution of the gains and losses in
absolute terms. Under the lump-sum tax scenario, the bell shape is less pronounced, while
under a proportional tax, the surplus decreases slightly less sharply.
Figure 2: Average consumer surplus variation and income.
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Note: Income is in e10,000. Local polynomial regressions with 2nd order polynomials.
Next, I investigate the heterogeneity of the monetary effects of the feebate across different
municipality sizes. The monetary gains in absolute terms are the largest for rural munici-
palities (less than 20,000 inhabitants) and the Paris area. However, the reverse occurs when
considering the monetary gains in relative terms: the largest relative gains are for large mu-
nicipalities. This result occurs because the average surplus is larger for small municipalities
where the utility of holding a car is higher. When a tax that is proportional to income is
imposed, there is a clear redistribution from the largest municipalities to the smallest ones.
The surplus losses in cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants are between e-11 and e-7,
which represent variations of -0.74% and -0.68% respectively.
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Table 10: Average variation in consumer surplus variation by population density.
Number of No tax Lump-sum tax Proportional tax
inhabitants level % level % level %
< 2,000 30 2.06 -2.51 -0.2 -1.15 -0.08
2,000-4,999 30.2 2.11 -2.31 -0.19 -1.25 -0.09
5,000-9,999 29.9 2.12 -2.53 -0.21 -1.34 -0.1
10,000-19,999 29.1 2.1 -3.35 -0.26 -1.58 -0.11
20,000-49,999 23.7 2.35 -8.83 -0.92 -6.65 -0.67
50,000-99,999 23.2 2.34 -9.3 -0.98 -6.56 -0.67
100,000-199,999 23.9 2.4 -8.57 -0.91 -6.86 -0.7
200,000-1,999,999 24.8 2.41 -7.65 -0.8 -7 -0.68
Paris area 28.6 2.31 -3.89 -0.38 -10.9 -0.74
Note: “Level” represents variations in absolute terms (e), while “%” rep-
resents variations in relative terms, with the value of the consumer surplus
without the feebate as a reference.
Next, I correlate the monetary effects of the feebate with other demographic characteristics
through descriptive regressions. I first regress the consumer surplus variation on the propor-
tion of households in each household size category and each socio-professional category. I
then use all the demographic characteristics together. The results of the 3 specifications
are displayed in Table 11. The correlation between the welfare gains and household size in
Specification (1) suggest that couples and families are associated with larger monetary gains
than singles, in absolute terms. However, in relative terms, singles gain the most. This result
occurs because singles obtain a lower surplus when buying a car; therefore, the monetary
gains appear greater in relative terms.
Specification (2) correlates the monetary benefits with the socio-professional category.
When analyzing the gains in absolute terms, the categories associated with the largest
gains are intermediate professionals, executives and entrepreneurs. Individuals in the low
socio-professional category such as farmers, manual laborers and employees are, in contrast,
associated with lower absolute gains. When examining the gains in relative terms, the com-
parison across categories is slightly different for executives and employees: executives’ gains
are comparable to those of retired individuals, and employees benefit more from the feebate
than retired individuals. The intermediate professions and executives benefit the most, while
farmers and manual laborers have the smallest gains.
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Finally, when using all the demographics together and adding the income, the income
squared and the population density, I find that household size and the socio-professional
category have a smaller and different influence on the benefit, which is a consequence of
the correlation between these demographic variables. Families with children and executives
are associated with higher monetary gains than the reference categories. As previously em-
phasized, income has a non-monotonic correlation with the monetary benefits of consumers.
Farmers, entrepreneurs, employees and manual laborers have slightly smaller gains than
retired individuals. I find significantly lower benefits in urban cities relative to rural mu-
nicipalities (e5 less). In relative terms, however, the monetary gains appear to be largest
for individuals living in dense cities (0.24% more than those in rural municipalities). The
relative gains are, in contrast, the lowest for large households, manual laborers and farmers.
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Table 11: Correlation between the average consumer surplus variation and the demographic
characteristics across municipalities.
(1) (2) (3)
level % level % level %
Intercept 10.4
(1.53)
∗∗ 2.74
(0.086)
∗∗ −26.7
(2.69)
∗∗ 1.77
(0.247)
∗∗ −28.3
(3.41)
∗∗ −1.3
(0.052)
∗∗
%Couple 3.72
(0.277)
∗∗ −0.085
(0.016)
∗∗ 0.157
(0.098)
−0.066
(0.001)
∗∗
%Family 1.58
(0.209)
∗∗ −0.064
(0.012)
∗∗ 1.14
(0.131)
∗∗ −0.062
(0.002)
∗∗
%Farmer 5.16
(0.298)
∗∗ −0.131
(0.026)
∗∗ −0.588
(0.205)
∗∗ −0.012
(0.003)
∗∗
%Entrepreneur 7.34
(0.363)
∗∗ −0.122
(0.026)
∗∗ −0.591
(0.25)
∗ −0.005
(0.003)
%Executive 7.89
(0.408)
∗∗ 0.016
(0.03)
1.1
(0.318)
∗∗ −0.006
(0.004)
%Intermediate 8.75
(0.543)
∗∗ 0.324
(0.049)
∗∗ −1.2
(0.413)
∗∗ 0.001
(0.005)
%Employee 1.26
(0.403)
∗∗ 0.07
(0.035)
∗ −0.694
(0.262)
∗∗ −0.003
(0.003)
%Manual laborer 4.81
(0.278)
∗∗ −0.101
(0.025)
∗∗ −0.551
(0.222)
∗ −0.012
(0.003)
∗∗
%Other activity 5.6
(0.284)
∗∗ 0.046
(0.026)
† −0.139
(0.186)
−0.008
(0.002)
∗∗
Income 48.7
(4.26)
∗∗ 3.64
(0.054)
∗∗
Income2 −9.2
(1.1)
∗∗ −0.793
(0.014)
∗∗
Urban −5.14
(0.06)
∗∗ 0.239
(0.001)
∗∗
Very urban −5.3
(0.072)
∗∗ 0.238
(0.001)
∗∗
Note: The dependent variables are the average consumer surplus variation in both absolute terms
and relative terms. Income is divided by e10,000. “%” stands for the percentage of households
in each category. Household sizes and professional activities are in 10%. The reference category
for household size is single, the reference category for the professional category is retired, and the
reference category for the size of the municipality is rural (less than 20,000 inhabitants). The
weighted regressions use the number of households as the weight for 31,584 municipalities in 2008.
Finally, I quantify the gains and losses for the different car manufacturers. Figure 3 displays
the profits both with and without feebate (see Table 12 below for the detailed figures). Even
if, overall, the feebate increased industry profits by 2.1%, the gains are heterogeneous across
manufacturers, and some were worse off because of the feebate regulation. The two French
manufacturers gain the most: the PSA Group’s profits increase by 96 million euros, while
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the gains for the Renault Group amounted to 60 million euros. The third largest winner of
the feebate policy is the Italian manufacturer Fiat with a net gain of 19 million euros. Fiat’s
profits increased the most in relative terms (6.2%). The increase in profits in relative terms
is smaller for PSA (4%) and Renault (3.4%). Daimler suffered the most in absolute terms
(-12.9 million euros), which corresponds to a reduction in its profits of 5.2%. Porsche is the
manufacturer with the largest profit reduction in relative terms (-32%). Mitsubishi, Chrysler,
Ssangyong and Lada were very significantly harmed by the feebate, with profit reductions of
10.9%, 18.5%, 20.3% and 30%, respectively.
Overall, there are clear winners and losers across car manufacturers: the French manufac-
turers and the Fiat Group are the big winners, while the big losers are the German manu-
facturers, except Volkswagen, which was barely affected (+0.30%). Among the Asian manu-
facturers there is more heterogeneity: most of them lose (Nissan, Suzuki, Honda, Mitsubishi,
Subaru, Ssangyong and Daihatsu), but some improved their situation (Toyota, Hyundai
and Mazda). Among the American car manufacturers, Ford and GM were better off, while
Chrysler was harmed.
Figure 3: Profits with and without the feebate.
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Note: The profits of the two smallest manufacturers are not plotted (Daihatsu and
Lada).
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Table 12: Profit variations by car manufacturer.
Group ∆Π ∆%Π Group ∆Π ∆%Π
1 PSA 95.9 4.02 11 HYUNDAI 2.39 2.06
2 RENAULT 60.4 3.41 12 SUZUKI -0.487 -0.451
3 VOLKSWAGEN 2.82 0.305 13 MAZDA 0.209 0.39
4 FORD 9.12 2.04 14 HONDA -2.04 -4.02
5 TOYOTA 1.22 0.365 15 CHRYSLER -4.76 -18.5
6 FIAT 19.5 6.19 16 MITSUBISHI -1.1 -10.9
7 GM 5.02 1.55 17 PORSCHE -2.31 -32.1
8 B.M.W. -3.8 -1.29 18 SUBARU -0.242 -6.11
9 DAIMLER -12.9 -5.17 19 SSANGYONG -0.625 -20.4
10 NISSAN -6.31 -3.83 20 DAIHATSU -0.0014 -0.499
21 LADA -0.0387 -30
Note: “∆Π” represents profit variations in million euros, and “∆%Π” represents profit variations
in percentages of the profits without the feebate.
4.4 Heterogeneity in the emissions of local pollutants
I analyze the heterogeneity of the feebate’s aftereffects on the emissions of local pollutants.
Note that I do not analyze the distributional impacts on CO2 emissions since these emissions
do not directly affect the air quality of individuals but have a global impact. Figure 4 displays
the distributions of the variations in average emissions for the 4 different pollutants. These
are the distributions over individuals since each municipality is weighted by the number of
households. Even though the feebate caused an increase in the emissions of all pollutants
at the aggregate level, average emissions actually decreased in some municipalities. Figure 5
in Appendix C displays the distribution of the variation of emissions in absolute terms and
provides similar insights.
While the overall increase in the average emissions of CO is marginal (+0.031%), the dis-
tribution is quite dispersed and varies from -0.32% to 0.17%. Average emissions decreased
in 5.4% of the municipalities, which represent 15.9% of the households, indicating that the
decline occurred in very populated cities. The largest drop occurred in the sixth “arrondisse-
ment” of Paris, which is a rich and populated area.
Average emissions of HC decreased in only 74 of the 31,584 municipalities (0.23%), which
represents 2.5% of the population. A large portion of the distribution is concentrated around
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rather large increases (between 0.3% and 0.7%). Similar to the average emissions of CO, the
emissions of HC increased the most in the sixth arrondissement of Paris.
The changes in average NOX appear to be quite heterogeneous across municipalities. The
variation in NOX emissions lies between -0.17% and 3.1%. The emissions decreased in 43%
of the municipalities, which represent 23% of the households. Unlike CO emissions, the level
of NOX mainly decreased in small cities.
In contrast, the distribution of the variation of PM emissions is very concentrated around
low values with an important tail. Similar to the emissions of NOX, PM emissions decrease
in a large percentage of the municipalities (34%), but only a small proportion of individuals
benefited from the decrease (17% of the households).
I now investigate how the heterogeneity of the feebate effect on emissions relates to the
demographic characteristics of the municipalities. I first examine the average variation in
emissions by income decile. There is a clear relation between the variations in emissions
and income deciles but with very differentiated patterns across pollutants. Emissions of CO
and HC increased more in poor municipalities than rich ones, while the opposite occurred
for NOX and PM. The average emissions of CO even decreased in the two highest income
deciles. Conversely, in the first two deciles, the emissions of NOX on average decreased and
PM decreased in the first income decile. The feebate, therefore, appears progressive for NOX
and PM but regressive for CO and HC.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the variation in average emissions across municipalities in percent-
age of the emissions without the feebate.
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Note: The kernel estimators are the densities of the variation in emissions with Gaussian
kernels. The estimation includes 31,584 municipalities, which are weighted by the number of
households.
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Table 13: The average variation in emissions by income decile.
Income decile ∆CO ∆NOX ∆HC ∆PM
Level % Level % Level % Level %
≤ d1 14,629 0.41 0.15 -0.11 -0.057 0.18 0.62 -0.016 -0.024
d1-d2 15,666 0.4 0.14 -0.025 -0.013 0.18 0.6 0.002 0.004
d2-d3 16,356 0.38 0.13 0.027 0.016 0.18 0.58 0.013 0.021
d3-d4 17,059 0.35 0.12 0.085 0.049 0.17 0.56 0.025 0.039
d4-d5 17,661 0.32 0.11 0.15 0.087 0.16 0.53 0.037 0.06
d5-d6 18,412 0.28 0.097 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.51 0.049 0.08
d6-d7 19,475 0.25 0.084 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.5 0.063 0.1
d7-d8 20,954 0.16 0.055 0.42 0.25 0.14 0.44 0.09 0.15
d8-d9 23,589 -0.005 0 0.66 0.42 0.11 0.35 0.14 0.24
d9-d10 50,696 -0.55 -0.16 1.4 1.1 0.035 0.1 0.25 0.51
Average 0.2 0.073 0.31 0.22 0.15 0.48 0.066 0.12
Note: In the second column, I provide the upper bound of the income decile. Variations by level are in
mg/km, except for PM, which are in mg/10 km. Variations by percentage are relative to the emissions
without the feebate.
Next, I compute the average variation in emission levels by municipality size. A clear
pattern emerges: CO and HC increased the most in rural areas (cities with fewer than 20,000
inhabitants). In Paris, the feebate actually caused a decrease of 0.19 mg/km in the average
emissions of CO but increased the average emissions of NOX by 0.85 mg/km and increased the
average emissions of PM by 0.16 mg/10 km. The opposite occurred for rural municipalities:
NOX emissions increased less than 0.1% in cities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, while
the emissions of HC increased by 0.6% and those of CO increased by 0.13%. The increase
in PM emissions was lower than 0.1% in municipalities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants
but reached 0.31% in the Paris area.
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Table 14: Variations in the average emissions of pollutants and municipality size.
Municipality ∆CO ∆NOX ∆HC ∆PM
size Level % Level % Level % Level %
< 2,000 0.37 0.13 0.095 0.062 0.18 0.6 0.027 0.046
2,000-4,999 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.068 0.18 0.59 0.03 0.051
5,000-9,999 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.068 0.18 0.59 0.03 0.051
10,000-19,999 0.37 0.13 0.077 0.052 0.18 0.6 0.024 0.041
20,000-49,999 0.23 0.078 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.46 0.057 0.096
50,000-99,999 0.24 0.084 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.47 0.051 0.086
100,000-199,999 0.21 0.071 0.29 0.18 0.14 0.45 0.063 0.11
200,000-1,999,999 0.16 0.055 0.36 0.23 0.13 0.42 0.076 0.13
Paris area -0.19 -0.045 0.83 0.66 0.085 0.27 0.16 0.31
Note: Variations in absolute terms are in mg/km for all pollutants except for PM, which is in mg/10 km.
Variations by percentage are relative to the value of the emissions without the feebate.
Finally, I correlate the variations in emissions with all the demographic characteristics
through a descriptive regression. I find that the variation in CO emissions by level is non-
linear for income, while squared income is not significant in the regression that uses the
variation in emissions by percentage as the dependant variable. Couples with and without
children are associated with larger increases in CO emissions than singles. Average CO
emissions decreased less in municipalities with relatively more farmers, executives and manual
laborers. As previously noted, cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants have on average
smaller increases in CO emissions, (between 0.17 and 0.19 mg/km less than in rural areas).
The relation between the variations in NOX and income is convex for relative variations
but linear for absolute variations. The emissions of NOX increased the most in regions with
more farmers (10% more farmers are associated with an additional increase in NOX emissions
of 0.027%) and executives (10% more executives are associated with an additional increase
in NOX emissions of 0.042%). Urban cities are associated with an increase in NOX emissions
of 0.14% more than rural areas.
The relation between the variations in HC and income is convex for variations both by level
and by percentage. The increases are, as previously highlighted, smaller in urban cities (-0.14
to -0.15%). Similar to the emissions of CO, the variations in HC emissions are negatively
correlated with farmers and executives.
Finally, the average relative variation in PM is linearly positively correlated with income,
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but the relation is concave for absolute variations. The increase is larger in urban areas
(+0.067% for cities with between 20,000 and 200,000 inhabitants and +0.072% for cities with
more than 200,000 inhabitants). I also find a positive correlation between the variations in
PM and executives and farmers. In contrast, there is a negative correlation with intermediate
professionals.
4.5 Performance of the feebate
I assess the performance of the actual feebate scheme in terms of the redistribution and
limitations of the emissions of local pollutants. I investigate alternative feebate schemes that
achieve the same average CO2 emissions and have the same monetary cost. Since, potentially,
there is an infinity of different feebates schemes defined by thresholds and the amount of the
fees and rebates, I consider only simple linear feebate schemes of the form:
λj = r × (ej − e¯)1(ej ≤ e¯) + t× (ej − e¯)1(ej ≥ e¯).
where λj represents the rebate (fee) associated with car model j, ej represents the CO2
emissions of the car, and e¯ is the pivot point that separates the positive and negative feebates.
r (t) is the marginal rebate (tax) rate for each unit of CO2 emission below (above) the pivot
point. Basically, I consider linear feebates that can have different slopes for the rebates
and fees. This restriction is necessary because I have two outcomes to match: average CO2
emissions and the monetary cost of the policy. Therefore, for a given pivot point, I solve
for the marginal tax and rebate rates such these two outcomes are matched to those of the
current feebate.
I compare the current feebate scheme to optimal feebates and consider several outcomes
and objective functions. I consider the consumer surplus, the national manufacturers’ profits
and a reduction in the emissions of local pollutants as outcomes. For each of these outcomes,
I consider different objective functions: a simple average, a weighted average, the individual
(car manufacturer) with the minimal surplus (profits) or municipality with the maximum
level of emissions and the difference between the maximum and the minimum (as a measure
of inequality). The different outcomes, objectives and corresponding formalized objective
functions are summarized in Table 16.
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Table 15: Correlation between the variations in average emissions and the demographic characteristics across municipalities.
∆CO ∆NOX ∆HC ∆PM
Level % Level % Level % Level %
Intercept 1.1
(0.095)
∗∗ 0.44
(0.095)
∗∗ −1.5
(0.11)
∗∗ −0.23
(0.107)
∗∗ 0.32
(0.018)
∗∗ 1.2
(0.018)
∗∗ −0.37
(0.025)
∗∗ −0.51
(0.025)
∗∗
Income −0.2
(0.11)
† −0.16
(0.11)
∗∗ 0.85
(0.13)
∗∗ −0.36
(0.125)
∗∗ −0.084
(0.022)
∗∗ −0.43
(0.022)
∗∗ 0.26
(0.029)
∗∗ 0.28
(0.029)
∗∗
Income2 −0.079
(0.028)
∗∗ −0.0029
(0.008)
0.0064
(0.032)
0.26
(0.032)
∗∗ 0.0017
(0.0056)
0.034
(0.006)
∗ −0.024
(0.0075)
∗∗ 0.0075
(0.008)
%Couple 0.024
(0.0034)
∗∗ 0.0066
(0.001)
∗∗ −0.014
(0.0033)
∗∗ −0.012
(0.0016)
∗∗ 0.0063
(0.0006)
∗∗ 0.019
(0.0016)
∗∗ −0.0034
(0.0008)
∗∗ −0.0085
(0.0016)
∗∗
%Family 0.0032
(0.0041)
−0.0002
(0.0012)
0.015
(0.0043)
∗∗ −0.0061
(0.0023)
∗∗ 0.0021
(0.0008)
∗∗ 0.0058
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.0036
(0.001)
∗∗ 0.0038
(0.0022)
†
%Farmer −0.041
(0.0072)
∗∗ −0.01
(0.0022)
∗∗ 0.019
(0.0071)
∗∗ 0.027
(0.0032)
∗∗ −0.005
(0.0013)
∗∗ −0.0097
(0.0036)
∗∗ 0.0033
(0.0017)
† 0.011
(0.0033)
∗∗
%Entrepreneur −0.0098
(0.0086)
−0.0016
(0.0025)
−0.0026
(0.0085)
0.01
(0.0044)
∗ −0.0005
(0.0015)
0.0009
(0.0041)
−0.0013
(0.002)
0
(0.0042)
%Executive −0.083
(0.013)
∗∗ −0.023
(0.0038)
∗∗ 0.072
(0.012)
∗∗ 0.042
(0.0061)
∗∗ −0.013
(0.0022)
∗∗ −0.034
(0.006)
∗∗ 0.016
(0.003)
∗∗ 0.035
(0.0059)
∗∗
%Intermediate 0.021
(0.012)
† 0.0067
(0.0034)
∗ −0.031
(0.013)
∗ −0.0075
(0.0074)
0.0046
(0.0022)
∗ 0.014
(0.0059)
∗ −0.0077
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.015
(0.0067)
∗
%Employee −0.0006
(0.0083)
0.001
(0.0025)
−0.0098
(0.0085)
0.0052
(0.0043)
0.0008
(0.0015)
0.0044
(0.0041)
−0.0029
(0.002)
−0.0034
(0.0042)
%Manual laborer −0.015
(0.0077)
∗ −0.0021
(0.0023)
−0.0011
(0.0076)
0.017
(0.0036)
∗∗ −0.0013
(0.0013)
0.0008
(0.0038)
−0.0011
(0.0018)
0.0028
(0.0036)
%Other −0.032
(0.0067)
∗∗ −0.0082
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.021
(0.0065)
∗∗ 0.022
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.0044
(0.0012)
∗∗ −0.0097
(0.0032)
∗∗ 0.0042
(0.0016)
∗∗ 0.011
(0.0031)
∗∗
Urban −0.17
(0.0021)
∗∗ −0.06
(0.0006)
∗∗ 0.22
(0.0021)
∗∗ 0.13
(0.001)
∗∗ −0.04
(0.0004)
∗∗ −0.14
(0.001)
∗∗ 0.039
(0.0005)
∗∗ 0.067
(0.0009)
∗∗
Very urban −0.19
(0.0026)
∗∗ −0.065
(0.0008)
∗∗ 0.23
(0.0025)
∗∗ 0.14
(0.0013)
∗∗ −0.042
(0.0004)
∗∗ −0.15
(0.0012)
∗∗ 0.041
(0.0006)
∗∗ 0.072
(0.0011)
∗∗
Note: The dependent variables are the variations in average emissions by level and by percentage. Income is divided by e10,000. “%”
stands for the percentage of households in each category. Household sizes and professional activities are in 10%. The reference category
for household size is single, the reference category for the professional category is retired and the reference category for the size of the
municipality is rural. The weighted regressions use the number of households as the weight for 31,584 municipalities in 2008.
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Table 16: Summary of the objective functions and outcomes of interest.
Outcome Objective Function
CS Simple average maxλj
∑
m φmCSm(λ1, ..., λJ)
CS Weighted average maxλj
∑
m
φm
Im
CSm(λ1, ..., λJ)
CS Min maxλj minmCSm(λ1, ..., λJ)
CS Max - min minλj (maxmCSm(λ1, ..., λJ)−minmCSm(λ1, ..., λJ))
French profits Simple average maxλj
∑
f Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)
French profits Weighted average maxλj
∑
f
1
sf
Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)
French profits Min maxλj minf Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)
French profits Max - min minλj (maxf Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)−minf Πf (λ1, ..., λJ))
Pollutant Simple average minλj
∑
m φmηm(λ1, ..., λJ).
Pollutant Weighted average minλj
∑
m η˜mηm(λ1, ..., λJ)
Pollutant Max minλj maxm ηm(λ1, ..., λJ)
Pollutant Max - min minλj (maxm ηm(λ1, ..., λJ)−minm ηm(λ1, ..., λJ))
Note: “CS” stands for consumer surplus. The consumer surplus weights are inversely proportional to
the income Im. The profit weights are inversely proportional to the market share of the car manufacturer
sf . The emissions weights are proportional to the average level of emissions η˜m in 2008, with the feebate.
I solve for the optimal feebate scheme associated with an objective function and an outcome
with a grid search. For each value of the pivot point between 89 and 219 g/km, I solve for the
slope parameters r and t such that average CO2 emissions and the cost of the policy are the
same as those with the actual feebate.13 Then, I select the optimal scheme associated with the
given objective function and the objective outcome. I jointly solve for the slope parameters
of the feebate and the new market equilibrium (optimal prices and market shares). The
computation of each feebate scheme solves for a system of 1,012 non-linear equations (1,010
car prices and 2 feebate parameters). I increase the computation speed by imputing relevant
initial values for the feebate parameters. These initial values are the solutions of a simplified
problem that assumes car manufactures do not react and entirely pass the feebate through
to the consumers. Second, I find that the optimal feebates are always lower than the value
of 145 g/km for the pivot point, so I perform the search on a sparser grid from 160 g/km
(every 10 g/km instead of every g/km). I check the robustness of the results to the use of
a finer grid on the sample of 3,000 municipalities. The results of the robustness check are
13I also performed the same exercise matching this time the total carbon emissions instead of the average
CO2 emissions. The results are available upon request, but the insights do not fundamentally change.
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displayed in Table 22 in Appendix C. These results are consistent with the results using
all municipalities and indicate that the findings are not driven by a grid-search that is too
coarse.
The first row of Table 17 suggests that the actual feebate performs very well for consumer
surplus maximization. In fact, the best simple linear feebates have lower performance than
the actual feebate for maximizing the average surplus and the minimal surplus. The feebate
scheme that maximizes the simple average consumer surplus has almost identical slopes for
the rebates and fees (the feebate parameters are indicated in parentheses below the potential
gains in Table 17). The inequalities across individuals could be reduced with a simple linear
feebate but with potential gains that are moderate (1.6%). The corresponding optimal feebate
scheme has a pivot point of 130 g/km, wich is lower than the pivot points for feebates that
maximize the average surplus and the smallest individual surplus. The optimal feebate
for inequality reduction therefore provides large rebates and imposes low taxes on a large
percentage of the cars (the slope is e10 g/km for fees and e61 g/km for rebates).
On the other hand, there is room to increase profits for the French manufacturers by a
large amount. Total French profits could be increased by almost 10%, and the weighted
average could be increased by 15% (the weights are inversely proportional to the manufac-
turers’ market shares, giving more importance to Renault than to PSA). There are also large
potential gains when the objective is to favor the weakest manufacturer: Renault’s profits
could be increased by 20.7%. The feebates that achieve this performance have a pivot point
between 115 and 117 g/km, slopes for fees between e6.8 and e7 and slopes for rebates be-
tween e367 and e504. Such optimal schemes result in very large rebates for a few vehicles
and low taxes for many cars. The gains in terms of reducing the inequalities between the
two car manufacturers are small (2%). This result occurs because both car manufacturers
offer similar car ranges, so the feebate cannot be manipulated too much to stimulate one
manufacturer at the expense of the other one.
There are small potential gains in terms of limiting the average emissions of local pollutants.
The potential gains reach 2.4% for the average emissions of NOX. When the objective is the
weighted average of emissions, the gains from the alternative feebates are slightly lower,
indicating that the increase in emissions is not more severe in municipalities with relatively
higher emissions. If the objective is to reduce emissions in the municipalities where they
are the highest, the potential gains are heterogeneous across the pollutants. The gains are
large for the emissions of CO (15%) and HC (13%) but very small for NOX and PM (0.4%
and 0.34%, respectively). This result reveals that the current feebate increases the emissions
of CO and HC in the municipality where they are the most concentrated but increases
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the emissions of NOX and PM where they are not the most concentrated. There are large
potential gains in terms of inequality reduction. For instance, the current feebate achieves
only slightly more than 50% of the maximal reduction in the difference between the lowest
and highest emissions of CO. The performance of the current feebate is slightly better for
NOX and PM, with moderate potential gains of 19% and 25%, respectively. The feebate
scheme that decreases inequalities is the same for all pollutants: the pivot point is minimal
(89 g/km), and the tax rate is very low (e8), which basically amounts to a tax on 99.8% of
the cars. This feebate scheme is also optimal for limiting the emissions of CO and HC for
all the objective functions. However, the reduction in the maximal levels of NOX and PM is
achieved through a feebate with a higher pivot point (114 or 115 g/km), a low marginal tax
rate (e7) and a high rebate rate (between e500 and e600).
Finally, the optimal feebates are heterogeneous across outcomes and objectives, revealing
that a regulator would have to make an arbitrage between the different feebate aftereffects
to select the optimal regulation.
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Table 17: Potential gains from the optimal simple feebates (in % of potential outcomes).
Outcome/Obj. Simple average Weighted average Min or max Max - min
CS -1.06 -1.03 -0.668 1.61
(146/19/21) (142/16/26) (137/13/36) (130/10/61)
Fr. profits 9.68 15.36 20.67 2.09
(117/7/367) (116/7/428) (115/7/504) (89/8/23,760)
CO 1.77 1.52 15.1 49.71
(89/8/23,760)
NOX 2.38 2.03 0.401 18.65
(114/7/593) (89/8/23,760)
HC 1.83 1.6 13.21 45.83
(89/8/23760)
PM 1.77 1.55 0.339 25.18
(115/7/504) (89/8/23,760)
Note: “CS” represents consumer surplus. The weights are inversely proportional to income for con-
sumer surpluses, inversely proportional to market shares for manufacturers’ profits and proportional
to average emissions for the pollutants.“Minor max” represents the minimal consumer surplus and
manufacturer profits and the maximal average emission levels. Values that appear in parentheses
are the parameters of the optimal feebate scheme and are in the following order: pivot point/rebate
rate/tax rate. The optimal feebates are selected from 78 feebate schemes that reach the same average
CO2 emissions and have the same monetary cost. A grid search was conducted for the pivot points
between 89 and 160 g/km, with an increment of 1 g/km, and between 160 and 219 g/km, with an
increment of 10 g/km. I use all the 31,584 municipalities.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I quantify both the direct effects and the aftereffects of the feebate policy and
find that the policy increased global welfare. Consumers are globally worse off, but their
loss is more than offset by an increase in the profits of French manufacturers. With a flat
tax rate, the feebate appears to be favorable to middle class income, while it is progressive
with a tax that is proportional to income. The policy decreased average CO2 emissions but
increased the emissions of all local pollutants. The effects of the feebate on local pollutants
are heterogeneous across the territory. The feebate increased the local emissions of NOX and
PM in rich and dense municipalities where pollution problems are the most severe, while the
levels of CO and HC increased the most in the poorest areas and in rural areas. Finally, the
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performance of the implemented feebate is good in terms of consumer surplus, but French
manufacturers profits could be further increased. The emissions of local pollutants could
be limited with alternative feebate schemes. However, there is not a single optimal feebate
scheme that improves all the outcomes at the same time. The design of an optimal feebate
scheme would require the regulator to define her objective and to specify the weight associated
with each outcome.
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A Predicting the emissions of local pollutants
Table 19 displays the main estimation results of the regressions of the emissions on car
characteristics. First, note that the difference in sample sizes comes from non-uniform missing
values across pollutants. I obtain rather good fits for the regressions with R2 between 0.32
and 0.90. Car characteristics best explain the within-car model variation in the emissions of
NOX, while they have less explanatory power for CO and PM emissions.
Table 18 presents the limits on the emissions of CO, NOX, HC and PM imposed by Euro
4, Euro 5, and Euro 6 standards. The year refers to the introduction of the new standard for
the certification of vehicles. Note that for diesel cars, HC is not regulated per se, but there is
a limit on the amount of total emissions of HC and NOX. Since the limits on HC and NOX
together follows exactly the limits on NOX, I assume there is no change in the limit on HC
for diesel engines between Euro 4 and Euro 5. This assumption is also consistent with the
constant limit on HC for gasoline cars. PM started to be regulated for gasoline cars with
Euro 5. However, it was only applied to vehicles with direct injection engines, which did not
represent the majority of vehicles sold before 2008.
Table 18: Emission standards under Euro 4, Euro 5 and Euro 6 and the estimated and
predicted coefficients.
Euro 4 Euro 5 Euro 6 Coef. Euro 4/5 Coef. Euro 5/6
(2005) (2009) (2014) (predicted) (estimated)
Diesel CO 500 500 500 0 0
NOX 250 180 80 70.2 100.2
HC+NOX 300 230 170 0 0
PM 250 50 45 63.3 1.6
Gasoline CO 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 0
NOX 80 60 60 20 0
HC 100 100 100 0 0
PM 50∗ 45∗ 3.1 1.5
Note: All emissions are in mg/km, except PM, which is in mg/10 km. ∗Only engines with
direct injection are subject to the regulation on the emissions of PM.
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Table 19: Regression of the emissions of local pollutants on car characteristics.
NOX CO HC PM
Horsepower × Gasoline 1.4
(0.02)
∗∗ 2.5
(0.11)
∗∗ 0.75
(0.01)
∗∗ −0.5
(0.01)
∗∗
Horsepower × Diesel 3.7
(0.039)
∗∗ 32.2
(0.21)
∗∗ 2.2
(0.019)
∗∗ 1.2
(0.013)
∗∗
Weight × Gasoline −0.026
(0.11)
−8.2
(0.59)
∗∗ 2.2
(0.052)
∗∗ −0.35
(0.051)
∗∗
Weight × Diesel −1.2
(0.05)
∗∗ −5.4
(0.28)
∗∗ −0.16
(0.024)
∗∗ −0.28
(0.015)
∗∗
CO2 × Gasoline −0.26
(0.006)
∗∗ 0.54
(0.035)
∗∗ −0.27
(0.003)
∗∗ 0.12
(0.004)
∗∗
CO2 × Diesel 0.29
(0.006)
∗∗ −1.1
(0.03)
∗∗ −0.18
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.008
(0.002)
∗∗
Wagon × Gasoline 2.8
(0.47)
∗∗ 10.6
(2.6)
∗∗ 3.4
(0.23)
∗∗ 0.44
(0.13)
∗∗
Wagon × Diesel −4
(0.38)
∗∗ −26.1
(2.1)
∗∗ −1.5
(0.18)
∗∗ −0.86
(0.18)
∗∗
Convertible × Gasoline 9.6
(0.46)
∗∗ −8.9
(2.6)
∗∗ 5.2
(0.23)
∗∗ −0.51
(0.14)
∗∗
Convertible × Diesel −7.6
(0.56)
∗∗ −55.1
(3.1)
∗∗ −4.5
(0.27)
∗∗ −0.28
(0.29)
Euro 6 × Gasoline −1.5
(0.15)
∗∗
Euro 6 × Diesel −100.2
(0.36)
∗∗ −1.6
(0.14)
∗∗
Trend × Gasoline −0.27
(0.21)
−8.1
(1.2)
∗∗ −1.3
(0.1)
∗∗ −0.7
(0.072)
∗∗
Trend × Diesel −0.016
(0.16)
−3
(0.9)
∗∗ −0.22
(0.079)
∗∗ −0.057
(0.051)
2014 0.35
(0.27)
10.1
(1.5)
∗∗ 0.66
(0.13)
∗∗ 0.11
(0.087)
2015 2.7
(0.47)
∗∗ 27.5
(2.5)
∗∗ 0.51
(0.22)
∗ −0.95
(0.15)
∗∗
Diesel 56.2
(1.1)
∗∗ −126.8
(6.3)
∗∗ −13.8
(0.55)
∗∗ −4.7
(0.62)
∗∗
Intercept 67.2
(1.4)
∗∗ 265.1
(7.9)
∗∗ 47.6
(0.69)
∗∗ 11.6
(0.66)
∗∗
No. observations 75,687 75,687 75,628 35,420
R2 0.90 0.32 0.51 0.38
Note: NOX, CO and HC are in mg/km, while PM is in mg/10 km. Weight
is in 100 kg. All the regressions include model-name fixed effects. R2
represents the share of the within-car model variance that is explained by
the model.
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B Sample selection
I consider a representative sample of 3,000 municipalities that are randomly drawn from all
the municipalities in France for which I observe all the relevant demographic characteristics.
I use the number of households in the municipality as the weight. The restricted sample
is used only for the estimation, while the counterfactual simulations are conducted at the
national level, and the estimated parameters of the preferences are used to compute the
market share for all the municipalities.
Table 20 shows the average demographic characteristics of the municipalities in both the
exhaustive sample and the sample used for the estimation. The sample is very representative
of the entire territory, except that the urban and very urban areas are over-represented
compared to rural areas. This result is a direct consequence of drawing a representative
sample since rural areas have a lower population density.
The sample of the municipalities selected shows important variations in the demographic
characteristics, which is crucial for identifying the parameters of heterogeneity. For instance,
the median income in the sample is between approximately e4,000 and e44,000. Note that
the variation in income is due to variations across municipalities and variations over time,
while the other demographic characteristics are fixed over time. The frequency of the different
professional activities have a large range from 0 to between 46% and 93%.
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Table 20: Descriptive statistics for the exhaustive dataset and the sample dataset.
Exhaustive Sample
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
No. of households 15,611 30,317 15 194,661 28,212 37,875 44 194,661
Income 16,888 3,590 5,601 50,696 17,295 4,241 7,229 43,849
Household size
Single 0.33 0.1 0.043 0.63 0.38 0.1 0.083 0.59
Couple 0.3 0.055 0.067 0.71 0.28 0.044 0.15 0.53
Family 0.37 0.087 0 0.78 0.35 0.089 0.14 0.68
Professional activity
Farmer 0.012 0.026 0 0.47 0.0033 0.0091 0 0.33
Entrepreneur 0.046 0.024 0 0.46 0.04 0.015 0 0.2
Executive 0.1 0.07 0 0.51 0.13 0.087 0 0.45
Intermediate 0.15 0.043 0 0.52 0.15 0.032 0 0.46
Employee 0.12 0.041 0 0.47 0.13 0.031 0 0.26
Manual laborer 0.18 0.069 0 0.69 0.16 0.064 0 0.5
Retired 0.34 0.084 0 0.93 0.31 0.077 0.071 0.86
Other activity 0.06 0.043 0 0.58 0.077 0.044 0 0.25
Municipality size
Rural 0.44 0.5 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1
Urban 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.27 0.44 0 1
Very urban 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.56 0.5 0 1
Note: The statistics are weighted by the number of households.
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C Additional Tables and Figures
Table 21: Influence matrix for the the heterogeneity parameters and the micro moments.
Moment Income, Income, Urban, Urban, Couple, Income Urban Couple
/parameter fuel cost price fuel cost weight cylinder
Income×fuel cost -0.368 1.08 0.058 -0.029 0.071 0.06 -0.019 -0.31
Income×price 1.07 -3.77 -0.118 0.068 -0.213 -0.124 0.095 0.866
Urban×fuel cost 0.125 -0.019 -0.857 0.49 -0.383 -1.04 0.148 0.329
Urban×weight -0.077 0 0.511 -0.336 0.306 0.739 -0.046 -1.02
Couple×cylinder -0.189 -0.545 -0.246 -0.47 4.38 3.41 4.61 -72
Table 21 provides the influence matrix for the micro moments and the parameters of hetero-
geneity. This table reveals which moments are the most crucial for parameter identification.
Most of the time, the largest influence comes from the moments constructed from the covari-
ance between the corresponding demographic and product characteristics. This is, however,
not the case for the parameters of income that are interacted with the fuel cost, which is
most influenced by the covariance between income and price. The parameter for urban areas
interacted with the fuel cost is most influenced by the average income. Perhaps even more
surprising, the coefficient of urban areas interacted with weight is not influenced the most
by the moment constructed from the covariance between urban areas and weight but by the
average percentage of couples, the average income and the covariance between urban areas
and the fuel cost.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the variations in average emissions by level across municipalities.
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Note: The kernel estimator of the density of the variation of average pollutants uses a Gaussian
kernel. I use the 31,584 municipalities weighted by the number of households.
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Table 22: Potential gains from the optimal simple feebates (based on the % of the potential
outcomes) for the sample of 3,000 municipalities.
Outcome / Objective Simple average Weighted average Min/Max Max - Min
Consumer surplus 0.028 0.01 -0.007 0.124
French manuf. profits 2.96 11.27 18.61 9.88
CO 1.67 1.39 10.56 35.35
NOX 2.64 2.18 0.651 11.18
HC 1.7 1.45 9.71 34.48
PM 1.94 1.64 0.528 17.32
Note: Weights are inversely proportional to income for consumer surplus, inversely proportional
to market share for manufacturers’ profits and proportional to average emissions for the pollu-
tants.“Min/Max” represents the minimal surplus and manufacturer profits and the maximal aver-
age emission levels. Optimal feebates are selected from 651 feebate schemes that reach the same
average CO2 emissions and have the same monetary cost. The grid search was conducted over 651
pivot points between 89 and 219 g/km, with an increment of 0.2 g/km. I use the sample of 3,000
municipalities.
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